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Abstract
The safety of mobile robots in dynamic environments is predicated on making sure that they do not
collide with obstacles. In support of such safety arguments, we analyze and formally verify a series of
increasingly powerful safety properties of controllers for avoiding both stationary and moving obstacles:
(i) static safety, which ensures that no collisions can happen with stationary obstacles, (ii) passive safety,
which ensures that no collisions can happen with stationary or moving obstacles while the robot moves,
(iii) the stronger passive friendly safety in which the robot further maintains sufficient maneuvering
distance for obstacles to avoid collision as well, and (iv) passive orientation safety, which allows for
imperfect sensor coverage of the robot, i. e., the robot is aware that not everything in its environment
will be visible. We complement these provably correct safety properties with liveness properties: we
prove that provably safe motion is flexible enough to let the robot still navigate waypoints and pass
intersections. We use hybrid system models and theorem proving techniques that describe and formally
verify the robot’s discrete control decisions along with its continuous, physical motion. Moreover, we
formally prove that safety can still be guaranteed despite sensor uncertainty and actuator perturbation,
and when control choices for more aggressive maneuvers are introduced. Our verification results are
generic in the sense that they are not limited to the particular choices of one specific control algorithm
but identify conditions that make them simultaneously apply to a broad class of control algorithms.
Keywords: provable correctness, obstacle avoidance, navigation, ground robot, hybrid systems
1 Introduction
Autonomous ground robots are increasingly popular as consumer products, ranging from today’s autonomous
household appliances [7] to the driverless cars of the future being tested on public roads1. With the robots
leaving the tight confounds of a lab or a locked-off industrial production site, robots face an increased need
for ensuring safety not only for the sake of the consumer, but also the manufacturer. One of the most im-
portant and challenging safety considerations is to ensure motion safety and that the mobile robot does not
collide with any obstacles [3, 37, 39].
In this article, we provide formal proofs as rigorous evidence for the safety of a broad class of obstacle
avoidance control algorithms of a robot. In order to take the vagaries of the physical environment into
account, these guarantees are for hybrid system models that include discrete control decisions, reaction
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delays, differential equations for the robot’s physical motion, bounded sensor uncertainty, and bounded
actuator perturbation.
One of the subtle conceptual difficulties, however, is what safety even means for an autonomous robot.
We would want it to be collision-free, but that usually requires other vehicles to be sensible, e. g., not actively
try to run into the robot when it is just stopped in a corner. One way of doing that is to assume stringent
constraints on the behavior of obstacles [3, 14]. In this article, we want to refrain from doing so and allow
arbitrary obstacles with an arbitrary continuous motion respecting a known upper bound on their velocity.
Then our robot is safe, intuitively, if no collision can ever happen where the robot is to blame. For static
obstacles, the situation is easy, because the robot is to blame for every collision that happens, so our safety
property and its proof show that the robot will never collide with any static obstacle. For dynamic obstacles,
safety is subtle, because other moving agents might actively try to ruin safety and cause collisions even if
our robot did all it could to prevent them. The first notion we consider is static safety, which requires that the
robot does not collide with any stationary obstacle. As second notion, we analyze passive safety [17], which
requires that the robot does not actively collide, i. e., collisions only happen when a moving obstacle ran
into the robot while the robot was stopped. Our proofs guarantee passive safety with minimal assumptions
about obstacles. The difficulty with passive safety is that it still allows the robot to go kamikaze and stop
in unsafe places, creating unavoidable collision situations in which an obstacle has no control choices left
that would prevent a collision. The third notion we consider is passive friendly safety [17], which aims for
more careful robot decisions that respect the features of moving obstacles (e. g., their braking capabilities).
A passive friendly robot not only ensures that it is itself able to stop before a collision occurs, but it also
maintains sufficient maneuvering room for obstacles to avoid a collision as well. Finally, we introduce
passive orientation safety, which restricts the responsibility of the robot to avoid collisions to only parts of
the robots surroundings (e. g., the robot is responsible for collisions with obstacles to the its front and sides,
but obstacles are responsible when hitting the robot from behind).
Motion safety and obstacle avoidance lead to interesting cognitive robotics questions: how much does
the robot have to know about the goals and constraints of other vehicles so as not to be considered to blame?
In this article, we successively construct models and proofs that increase the level of assumed knowledge
and explicitly expressed uncertainty. We start with (i) static safety for the case of static obstacles. Then
we consider (ii) passive safety, which assumes a known upper bound on the velocity of obstacles. Then we
extend to (iii) passive friendly safety for a known lower bound of an obstacle’s braking power and upper
bound on its reaction time to initiate collision avoidance attempts. We introduce (iv) a new notion of passive
orientation safety, which accounts for limited sensor coverage and robot orientation. Finally, we introduce
(v) notions of progress used in liveness properties to show under which circumstances a safe robot can also
reach a goal position.
Note that all our models use symbolic bounds so they hold for all choices of the bounds. As a result,
we can account for uncertainty in several places (e. g., by instantiating upper bounds on acceleration or time
with values including uncertainty). We additionally show how further uncertainty that cannot be attributed
to such bounds (in particular location uncertainty, velocity uncertainty, and actuator uncertainty) can be
modeled and verified explicitly.
The class of control algorithms we consider is inspired by the well-known dynamic window algorithm
[9], but is equally significant for most other control algorithms when combining our results of provable
safety with verified runtime validation [20]. Unlike related work on obstacle avoidance (e. g., [1, 22, 36–
38]), we use hybrid system models and verification techniques that describe and verify the robot’s discrete
control choices along with its continuous, physical motion. In summary, our contributions are (i) hybrid
system models of navigation and obstacle avoidance control algorithms of robots, (ii) safety proofs that they
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guarantee static safety, passive safety, passive friendly safety, and passive orientation safety in the presence
of stationary and moving obstacles despite sensor uncertainty and actuator perturbation, and (iii) liveness
proofs that the safety measures are flexible enough to allow the robot to reach a goal position and pass
intersections. The models and proofs of this article are bundled with the KeYmaera theorem prover [34].2
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss related work on navigation and
obstacle avoidance of robots that focuses on verification. Section 3 recalls differential dynamic logic that
we use as a modeling formalism for the hybrid system dynamics of a robot and the safety and liveness
constraints, while Section 4 recalls the dynamic window approach [9] for obstacle avoidance. Section 5
introduces the dynamic model of robots and obstacles that we are going to use throughout this article. In
Section 6, we introduce models of obstacle avoidance control and physical motion, and prove that they
guarantee static safety, passive safety, passive friendly safety, and passive orientation safety with stationary
as well as moving obstacles. We then model uncertainty explicitly and prove that motion is still safe.
Section 8 introduces notions of progress and proves liveness of robot navigation. Section 9 illustrates the
symbolic findings of the proofs with examples of robots and environments. Section 10 describes how the
proofs of this article can be transformed into monitors that provable check safety at runtime, i. e., on a real
robot. Section 11 concludes the article.
2 Related Work
Isabelle has recently been used to formally verify that a C program implements the specification of the dy-
namic window algorithm [37]. This is interesting, but the algorithm itself and its impact on motion of the
robot was considered in an informal pen-and-paper argument only. We, instead, formally verify the correct-
ness of the dynamic window algorithm using a hybrid systems verification technique. Our contributions,
thus, complement the work in [37] in a twofold manner: First, we create physical models of the control and
the motion dynamics of the robot and formally verify correctness of the dynamic window algorithm control
for the combined hybrid systems dynamics. Second, we model stationary as well as moving obstacles and
prove multiple safety properties. These complementary results together present a strong safety argument
from concept (this article) to implementation [37].
PASSAVOID [3] is a navigation scheme, which avoids braking inevitable collision states (i. e., states
that regardless of the robot’s trajectory lead to a collision) to achieve safety in the presence of moving
obstacles. Since PASSAVOID is designed to operate in completely unknown environments, it ensures that
the robot is at rest when a collision occurs (passive safety). The motion dynamics of the robot have only
been considered in simulation. We prove the stronger passive friendly safety using a hybrid verification
technique (i. e., algorithm and motion dynamics), which ensures that the robot does not create unavoidable
collision situations by stopping in unsafe places.
For the purpose of guaranteeing infinite horizon safety, velocity obstacle sets [39] assume unpredictable
behavior for obstacles with known forward speed and maximum turn rate (i. e., Dubin’s cars). The authors
focus only on the obstacle behavior; the robot’s motion is explicitly excluded from their work. We comple-
ment their work and show that a robot, which has a known upper bound on its reaction time and considers
discs as velocity obstacle sets (i. e., known forward speed and unknown turn rate, as allowed by [39]), moves
safely.
Hybrid system models of driver support systems in cars [14, 19] have been verified with a model of the
continuous dynamics of cars. That points out interesting safety conditions for vehicles on straight lines, but
not in the general motion in the two-dimensions plane that we consider in this work.
2http://symbolaris.com/info/KeYmaera.html
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Safety of aircraft collision avoidance maneuvers in the two-dimensional plane was verified for constant
translational velocity and a rotational velocity that stays constant during the maneuver [15, 33]. Our models
include acceleration for both translational and rotational velocity and are generalized to address uncertainty.
LTLMoP contains an approach [35] to study high-level behavior for map exploration when the envi-
ronment is continuously updated. The approach synthesizes and re-synthesizes plans, expressed in linear
temporal logic, of a hybrid controller, when new map information is discovered. This work focuses on pre-
serving the state and task completion history, and thus on guaranteeing that the robot will follow a high-level
behavior (e. g., visit all rooms) even when the controller is re-synthesized, not on safe obstacle avoidance.
Pan et al. [22] propose a method to smooth the trajectories produced by sampling-based planners in a
collision-free manner. Our article proves that such trajectories are indeed safe when considering the control
choices of a robot and its continuous dynamics.
LQG-MP [38] is a motion planning approach that takes into account the sensors, controllers, and mo-
tion dynamics of a robot while working with uncertain information about the environment. The approach
assesses randomly generated paths by the approximated probability of a collision with an obstacle. One
goal is to select paths with low collision probability; however, guaranteeing collision-free motion is not
their focus, since a collision-free path may not even have been generated.
Althoff et al. [1] use a probabilistic approach to rank trajectories according to their collision probability.
To further refine such a ranking, a collision cost metric is proposed, which derives the cost of a potential
collision by considering the relative speeds and masses of the collision objects.
Seward et al. [36] try to avoid potentially hazardous situations by using Partially Observable Markov
Decision Processes. Their focus, however, is on a user-definable trade-off between safety and progress
towards a goal. Hence, safety is not guaranteed under all circumstances.
In summary, this article addresses safety of robot obstacle avoidance in the following manner.
• Unlike [3, 35–37, 39], we study combined models of the hybrid system dynamics in terms of discrete
control and differential equations for continuous physical motion of the robot as well as the obstacles,
not only discrete control alone or only the behavior of obstacles.
• Unlike [14, 15, 19, 33, 37], we verify safety in the two-dimensional plane not one-dimensional space
and do not assume constant translational and rotational velocity, but include accelerations for both, as
needed for ground vehicles.
• Unlike [1, 22, 35, 36, 38], we produce formal, deductive proofs in a formal verification tool. Note,
that in [37] the correctness of the implementation w.r.t. the algorithm’s specification was formally
verified, but not the motion of the robot.
• Unlike [22, 35, 37], we verify safety even in the presence of moving obstacles.
• Unlike [3, 22, 35, 37], we verify passive friendly safety, which is important because passive (non-
friendly) safe robots may cause unavoidable collisions by stopping in unsafe places so that obstacles
will collide with them. We also verify passive orientation safety, which is important for situations
with limited sensor ranges.
• Unlike [3, 14, 33, 35], we consider sensor and actuator uncertainty in our verification results.
• Unlike [1, 36, 38], we do not minimize or probabilistically minimize collisions, but prove that colli-
sions can never occur (as long as the robot fits to the model).
4
S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Obstacle Avoidance and Navigation of Ground Robots
3 Preliminaries: Differential Dynamic Logic
A robot and the moving obstacles in its environment form a hybrid system: they make discrete control
choices (e. g., compute the actuator set values for acceleration, braking, or steering), which in turn influence
their actual physical behavior (e. g., slow down to a stop, move along a curve). In a test-driven approach, a
simulator or field tests provide insight into the expected physical effects of the control code. In formal veri-
fication, by analogy, hybrid systems have been considered as joint models for both discrete and continuous
behavior, since verification of either component alone does not capture the full behavior of a robot and its
environment. In this section, we first give an overview of the relationship between testing, simulation, and
formal verification, before we introduce the syntax and semantics of the specification language that we use
for formal verification.
3.1 Testing, Simulation, and Formal Verification
Testing, simulation, and formal verification complement each other. Testing helps to make a system robust
under real-world conditions, whereas simulation lets us execute a large number of tests in an inexpensive
manner (at the expense of realistic conditions). Both, however, show correctness for the tested scenarios
only: testing and simulation discover the presence of bugs, but cannot show their absence. Formal verifi-
cation, in contrast, provides precise and undeniable guarantees for all possible executions of the modeled
behavior, assuming that the model adequately captures reality. Formal verification either discovers bugs if
present, or shows the absence of bugs in the model, but cannot show whether or not the model is realistic.
In Section 10, we will see how we can use runtime monitoring to bridge both worlds.
Testing, simulation, and formal verification all base on similar ingredients, but apply different levels of
rigor:
Software Testing and simulation run a specific control algorithm with specific parameters (e. g., run some
specific version of an obstacle avoidance algorithm with maximum velocity V = 2m/s); in formal
verification, we can specify symbolic parameters and nondeterministic inputs and effects and, thereby,
capture entire families of control algorithms and many scenarios at once (e. g., verify all velocities
0 ≤ v ≤ V for any maximum velocity V at once).
Hardware and physics Testing runs a real robot in a real environment. Both simulation and formal verifi-
cation, in contrast, base on a model of the hardware and physics to provide sensor values and compute
how software decisions result in real-world effects.
Requirements Testing and simulation can work with informal or semi-formal requirements (e. g., a robot
should not collide with obstacles—allows slack: could mean that collisions are acceptable when other
outcomes are even less desirable, whatever that means), whereas formal verification bases on math-
ematically precise formal requirements expressed as a logical formula (allows no slack in interpreta-
tion: unambiguously distinguishes between correct behavior and faults).
Process In testing and simulation, requirements are formulated as test conditions and expected test out-
comes. A test procedure then runs the robot several times under the test conditions and compares the
actual output with the expected outcome (e. g., run the robot in different spaces, with different obsta-
cles, various software parameters, and different sensor configurations to see whether or not any of the
runs fail to avoid obstacles). The test protocol serves as correctness evidence. In formal verification,
the requirements are formulated as a logical formula. A theorem prover then creates a mathematical
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proof showing that all possible executions—possibly infinitely many—of the model are correct (safety
proof), or showing that the model has a way to achieve a goal (liveness proof). The mathematical proof
is a correctness certificate.
The remainder of this section focuses on the syntax and semantics that we use for formal verification: it
introduces hybrid programs, which is a program notation for describing hybrid systems, and (quantified) dif-
ferential dynamic logic for specifying correctness conditions about these programs. Using hybrid programs,
we can specify how the robot and the obstacles in the environment make decisions and move physically.
With differential dynamic logic we can specify formally which behavior of a hybrid program is considered
correct.
3.2 Differential Dynamic Logic
In order to verify safe obstacle avoidance, we use differential dynamic logic dL [23, 25, 29], which has a
notation for hybrid systems as hybrid programs. We use hybrid programs for modeling a robot that follows
the dynamic window algorithm as well as for modeling the behavior of moving obstacles. dL allows us to
make statements that we want to be true for all runs of the program (safety) or for at least one run (liveness).
Both constructs are necessary to verify safety: for all possible control choices and entailed physical motion,
our robot must be able to stop, while at the same time there must be at least one possible execution in which
the obstacle is able to stop without collision as well.
One of the many challenges of developing robots is that we do not know the behavior of the environ-
ment exactly. For example, a moving obstacle may or may not slow down when our robot approaches it.
In addition to programming constructs familiar from other languages (e. g., assignments and conditional
statements), hybrid programs, therefore, provide nondeterministic operators that allow us to describe such
unknown behavior of the environment concisely. These nondeterministic operators are also useful to de-
scribe parts of the behavior of our own robot (e. g., we may not be interested in the exact value delivered by
a position sensor, but only that it is within some error range), which then corresponds to verifying an entire
family of controllers. Using nondeterminism to model our own robot has the benefit that later optimization
(e. g., mount a better sensor or implement a faster algorithm) does not necessarily require re-verification.
Table 1 summarizes the syntax of hybrid programs together with an informal semantics. Below, we
briefly describe each operator with an example. Sequential composition α;β says that β starts after α
finishes (e. g., first let the robot choose acceleration, then steering angle). The nondeterministic choice
α ∪ β follows either α or β (e. g., the obstacle may or may not slow down). The nondeterministic repetition
operator α∗ repeats α zero or more times (e. g., the robot may encounter obstacles over and over again, but
we do not know exactly how often). Assignment x := θ instantaneously assigns the value of the term θ
to the variable x (e. g., let the robot choose maximum braking), while x := ∗ assigns an arbitrary value
to x (e. g., an obstacle may choose any acceleration, we do not know which value exactly). x′ = θ & F
describes a continuous evolution of x within the evolution domain F (e. g., let the velocity of the robot
decrease according to the applied brakes, but not become negative—hitting the brakes won’t make the robot
drive backwards). The test ?F checks that a particular condition F holds, and aborts if it does not (e. g., test
whether or not the distance to an obstacle is large enough to continue with accelerating). A typical pattern
that involves assignment and tests is to limit the assignment of arbitrary values to known bounds (e. g., limit
an arbitrarily chosen acceleration to the physical limits of the robot, as in x := ∗; ?x ≤ A, which says x is
any value less or equal A).
The set of dL formulas is generated by the following EBNF grammar (where ∼ ∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >}
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Table 1: Hybrid program representations of hybrid systems.
Statement Effect
α; β sequential composition, first run α, then β
α ∪ β nondeterministic choice, following either α or β
α∗ nondeterministic repetition, repeats α n ≥ 0 times
x := θ assign value of term θ to variable x (discrete jump)
x := ∗ assign arbitrary real number to variable x(
x′1 = θ1, . . . , evolve xi along differential equation system x′i = θi
x′n = θn & F
)
restricted to maximum evolution domain F
and θ1, θ2 are arithmetic expressions in +,−, ·, / over the reals):
φ ::= θ1 ∼ θ2 | ¬φ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | φ→ ψ | ∀xφ | [α]φ | 〈α〉φ
Further operations, such as Euclidian norm ‖θ‖ and infinity norm ‖θ‖∞ of a vector θ, are definable.
To specify the desired correctness properties of hybrid programs, dL formulas of the form F → [α]G
mean that all executions of the hybrid program α, which start at a state in which formula F is true, lead to
states in which formula G is true. Dually, formula F → 〈α〉G expresses that there is a state reachable by
the hybrid program α that satisfies formula G.
Differential dynamic logic comes with a verification technique to prove those correctness properties.
We did all our proofs in the verification tool KeYmaera [34], which implements this verification technique
[23, 25, 30]. KeYmaera supports hybrid systems with nonlinear discrete jumps, nonlinear differential equa-
tions, differential-algebraic equations, differential inequalities, and systems with nondeterministic discrete
or continuous input. This makes KeYmaera more readily applicable to robotic verification than other hybrid
system verification tools, such as SpaceEx [10], which focuses on piecewise linear systems. KeYmaera im-
plements automatic proof strategies that decompose hybrid systems symbolically [25]. This compositional
verification principle helps scaling up verification, because KeYmaera verifies a big system by verifying
properties of subsystems. Strong theoretical properties, including relative completeness results, have been
shown about dL [23, 29].
3.3 Quantified Differential Dynamic Logic
Often, we want to analyze how the robot interacts with many other agents (e. g., avoid collision with each
one of many obstacles) or represent that it consists of or uses multiple instances of some device (e. g., several
location sensors). In order to prevent duplicating variables for each of the objects, which is undesirable even
for a very small, known number of objects, we need a way of referring to countably many objects concisely.
In this article, we discuss two ways of referring to countably many objects with differential dynamic logic:
• we can implicitly refer to many obstacles by choosing one nondeterministically (see nondeterministic
assignment above, used in Section 6.1–7.4), or
• we can explicitly refer to each obstacle individually by using quantification over objects of a sort (e. g.,
each object of the sort obstacle, used in Section 7.5).
Quantified differential dynamic logic QdL [26, 28] is an extension of differential dynamic logic suited for
verifying distributed hybrid systems by quantifying over sorts. The notion of hybrid programs is extended
7
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to quantified hybrid programs. Instead of using a single state variable x to describe an attribute of an object,
we can use a function term x : O → R in QdL to denote that object i has x-value x(i), for each i of sort O.
We use a non-rigid function term if we want to change its value (e. g., the position of an obstacle); otherwise
it is rigid (e. g., the maximum velocity of an obstacle). A sort describes hereby a class of objects (e. g., a sort
could be the class of all obstacles or the class of all moving obstacles). Pure differential dynamic logic dL
uses the sort R. An alternative way of expressing sorts would be to use a unary predicate symbol that is true
if and only if the object is of the desired sort. In QdL formulas we can use quantifiers to make statements
about the instances of a sort S with ∀i ∈ S and ∃i ∈ S, similar to what is possible in dL for the special sort
R.
QdL allows us to explicitly track properties of all obstacles simultaneously. Quantified hybrid programs
allow the evolution of properties expressed as non-rigid functions for all objects of the same sort simultane-
ously (e. g., all obstacles move simultaneously).
Table 2 lists statements that can be used in quantified hybrid programs in addition to those of hybrid
programs [26, 28].
Table 2: Statements of quantified hybrid programs [26, 28].
Statement Effect
∀i ∈ C x(i) := θ Assigns the value of term θ to x of all objects
of sort C . x is a non-rigid function.
∀i ∈ C (xj(i)′ = θj(i) evolve all x(i) along differential equations xj(i)′ =
& F
)
θj(i), . . . restricted to evolution domain F
4 Preliminaries: Obstacle Avoidance with the Dynamic Window Approach
The robotics community has come up with an impressive variety of robot designs, which differ not only
in their tool equipment, but also (and more importantly for the discussion in this article) in their kinematic
capabilities. We focus on wheel-based vehicles. In order to make our models applicable to a large variety
of robots, we use only limited control options (e. g., do not move sideways to avoid collisions since Acker-
mann drive could not follow such evasion maneuvers). We consider robots that drive forward (non-negative
translational velocity) in sequences of arcs in two-dimensional space.3 Such trajectories can be realized by
robots with single-wheel drive, differential drive, Ackermann drive, synchro drive, or omni drive [4]. In a
nutshell, in order to stay on the safe side, our models conservatively underestimate the capabilities of our
robot while conservatively overestimating the dynamic capabilities of obstacles.
Many different navigation and obstacle avoidance algorithms have been proposed for such robots, e. g.
dynamic window [9], potential fields [12], or velocity obstacles [8]. For an introduction to various navigation
approaches for mobile robots, see [2, 6]. In this article, our focus is on the dynamic window algorithm [9],
which is derived from the motion dynamics of the robot and thus discusses all aspects of a hybrid system
(models of discrete and continuous dynamics). Other control algorithms including even path planners based
on RRT [13] or A∗ [11] are compatible with our results when their control decisions are checked with a
runtime verification approach [20] against the safety conditions we identify for the motion here.
3If the radius of such a circle is infinite, the robot drives (forward) on a straight line.
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Table 3: Parameters, state variables of robot and obstacle
Notation Coordinates Description
pr (p
x
r , p
y
r) Position of the robot
vr Translational velocity
ar Translational acceleration, s.t. −b ≤ ar ≤ A
ωr Rotational velocity, s.t. ωrrc = vr
dr (d
x
r , d
y
r) Orientation of the robot, s.t. ‖dr‖ = 1
pc (p
x
c , p
y
c) Curve center, s.t. dr = (pr − pc)⊥
rc Curve radius, s.t. rc = ‖pr − pc‖
po (p
x
o , p
y
o) Position of the obstacle
vo (v
x
o , v
y
o ) Translational velocity, including orientation, s.t. ‖vo‖ ≤ V
A Maximum acceleration A ≥ 0
b Minimum braking b > 0
ε Maximum control loop reaction delay ε > 0
V Maximum obstacle velocity V ≥ 0
Ω Maximum rotational velocity Ω ≥ 0
The dynamic window algorithm is an obstacle avoidance approach for mobile robots equipped with
synchro drive [9] but can be used for other drives too [5]. It uses circular trajectories that are uniquely
determined by a translational velocity v together with a rotational velocity ω. The algorithm is roughly
organized into two steps: (i) The range of all possible pairs of translational and rotational velocities is
reduced to admissible ones that result in safe trajectories (i. e., avoid collisions since those trajectories allow
the robot to stop before it reaches the nearest obstacle). The admissible pairs are further restricted to those
that can be realized by the robot within a short time frame (the so-called dynamic window). If the set of
admissible and realizable velocities is empty, the algorithm stays on the previous safe curve (such curve
exists unless the robot started in an unsafe state). (ii) Progress towards the goal is optimized by maximizing
a goal function among the set of all admissible controls. For safety verification, we can omit the second step
and verify the stronger property that all choices that are fed into the optimization are safe, since even if none
is identified, the previous safe curve can be continued.
5 Robot and Obstacle Motion Model
This section introduces the robot and obstacle motion models that we are going to use throughout the article.
Table 3 summarizes the model variables and parameters of both the robot and the obstacle for easy reference.
In the following subsections, we illustrate their meaning in detail.
5.1 Robot State and Motion
The dynamic window algorithm safely abstracts the robot’s shape to a single point, since other shapes
reduce to adjusting the (virtual) shapes of the obstacles (cf. [18] for an approach to attribute robot shape
to obstacles). We also use this abstraction to reduce the verification complexity. Fig. 1 illustrates how we
model the position, orientation, and trajectory of a robot.
9
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(pxc , p
y
c ) = pc
(pxr , p
y
r) = pr
p˜r after time ε
rc = ‖pr − pc‖
trajectory (length vrε)
dr = (d
x
r , d
y
r)ωrε
dxr = cos θ
sin θ = dyr
Figure 1: State illustration of a robot on a two-dimensional plane. The robot has position pr = (pxr , p
y
r),
orientation dr = (dxr , d
y
r), and drives on circular arcs (thick arc) of radius rc with translational velocity vr,
rotational velocity ωr and thus angle ωrε around curve center points pc = (pxc , p
y
c ). In time ε the robot will
reach a new position p˜r, which is vrε away from the initial position pr when measured along the robot’s
trajectory arc.
The robot has state variables describing its current position pr = (pxr , p
y
r), translational velocity vr ≥ 0,
translational acceleration ar, an orientation vector4 dr = (cos θ, sin θ), and angular velocity5 θ′ = ωr. The
translational and rotational velocities are linked w.r.t. the rigid body planar motion by the formula rcωr = vr,
where the curve radius rc = ‖pr − pc‖ is the distance between the robot and the center of its current curve
pc = (p
x
c , p
y
c ). Following [24], we use differential axiomatization to encode sine and cosine functions in
the dynamics using the extra variables dxr = cos θ and d
y
r = sin θ to avoid undecidable arithmetic. The
continuous dynamics for the dynamic window algorithm [9] can be described by the differential equation
system of ideal-world dynamics of the planar rigid body motion:
p′r = vrdr, v
′
r = ar, d
′
r = ωrd
⊥
r , (rcωr)
′ = ar
where
• p′r = vrdr is vector notation for pxr ′ = vrdxr , pyr ′ = vrdyr ,
• the condition d′r = ωd⊥r is vector notation for dxr ′ = −ωrdyr , dyr ′ = ωrdxr where ⊥ is the orthogonal
complement, and
• the condition (rcωr)′ = ar encodes the rigid body planar motion rcωr = vr that we consider.
The dynamic window algorithm assumes direct instantaneous control of the translational velocity vr.
We, instead, control acceleration ar and do not perform instant changes of the velocity. Our model is closer
to the actual dynamics of a robot, which cannot really change its velocity from 20 to 2 instantly. The
realizable velocities follow from the differential equation system according to the controlled acceleration
ar.
Fig. 2a depicts the position and velocity changes of a robot accelerating on a circle around a center point
pc = (2, 0). The robot starts at pr = (0, 0) as initial position, with vr = 2 as initial translational velocity and
ωr = 1 as initial rotational velocity; Fig. 2d shows the resulting circular trajectory. Fig. 2b and Fig. 2e show
the resulting curve when braking (the robot brakes along the curve and comes to a complete stop before
completing the circle). If the rotational velocity is constant (ω′r = 0), the robot drives an Archimedean
4As stated earlier, we study unidirectional motion: the robot moves along its direction, that is the vector dr gives the direction
of the velocity vector.
5The derivative with respect to time is denoted by prime (′).
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Figure 2: Trajectories of the robot over time (top) or in planar space (bottom).
spiral with the translational and rotational accelerations controlling the spiral’s separation distance (ar/ω2r ).
The corresponding trajectories are shown in Figures 2c and 2f.
We assume bounds for the permissible acceleration ar in terms of a maximum acceleration A ≥ 0 and
braking power b > 0, as well as a bound Ω on the permissible rotational velocity ωr. We use ε to denote
the upper bound for the control loop time interval (e. g., sensor and actuator delays, sampling rate, and
computation time). That is, the robot may react as quickly as it wants, but it can take no longer than time ε.
Note, that the robot would not be safe without such a time bound, because its control might never run. In
our model, all these bounds will be used as symbolic parameters and not concrete numbers. Therefore, our
results apply to all values of these parameters and can be enlarged to include uncertainty.
5.2 Obstacle State and Motion
An obstacle has (vectorial) state variables describing its current position po = (pxo , pyo) and velocity vo =
(vxo , v
y
o ). The obstacle model is deliberately very liberal to account for many different obstacle behaviors.
The only restriction about the dynamics is that the obstacle moves continuously with bounded velocity
‖vo‖ ≤ V while the physical system evolves for ε time units. Note, that the dynamic window algorithm
considers a special case V = 0 (obstacles are stationary). Depending on the relation of V to ε, moving
obstacles can make quite a difference, e. g., when fast obstacles meet communication-based virtual sensors
as in RoboCup.6
6http://www.robocup.org/
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6 Safety Verification of Ground Robot Motion
Table 4: Overview of safety notions, responsibilities of the robot and its assumptions about the obstacle
Safety Responsibility of Robot Assumptions about Obstacles
Static
Sec-
tion 6.1
Positive distance to all stationary obstacles Obstacles remain stationary and never move
ψss ≡ ‖pr − po‖ > 0 ζss ≡ vo = 0
Passive
Sec-
tion 6.2
Positive distance to all obstacles while driv-
ing
Known maximum velocity of obstacles
ψps ≡ v 6= 0→ ‖pr − po‖ > 0 ζps ≡ |vo| ≤ V
Passive
Friendly
Sec-
tion 6.3
Passive safety plus sufficient maneuvering
space for obstacles when stopped
Passive safety plus known minimum brak-
ing capability and known maximum reaction
time of obstacles
ψpfs ≡ ψps ∧ (vr = 0 ∧ ‖pr − po‖ >
V 2
2bo
+ τV ∧ 0 ≤ vo ≤ V ) →
〈obstacle〉 (‖pr − po‖ > 0 ∧ vo = 0)
ζpfs ≡ ζps ∧ bo > 0 ∧ τ ≥ 0
Passive
Orien-
tation
Sec-
tion 6.4
Positive distance to all obstacles while driv-
ing, unless an invisible obstacle interfered
with the robot while the robot stayed cau-
tiously inside its observable region
Passive safety
vr 6= 0 →
(‖pr − po‖ > 0 ∨
(isVisible ≤ 0 ∧ |β| < γ)) ζps
We want to prove motion safety of a robot that avoids obstacles by dynamic window navigation. Starting
from a simplified robot controller, we develop increasingly more realistic models, and discuss different
safety notions. Static safety describes a vehicle that never collides with stationary obstacles. Under passive
safety [17], the vehicle is in a safe state if it is able to come to a full stop before making contact with an
obstacle (i. e., the vehicle does not itself collide with obstacles, so if a collision occurs at all then while
the vehicle was stopped). Passive safety, however, puts the burden of avoiding collisions mainly on other
objects. We further want to prove the stronger passive friendly safety [17]: we want to guarantee that our
robot will come to a full stop safely under all circumstances, but will also leave sufficient maneuvering
room for moving obstacles to avoid a collision.7 Finally, we want to prove passive orientation safety, which
accounts for the sensor coverage of the robot and its orientation to reduce the responsibility of the robot in
structured spaces, such as on roads with lanes.
Table 4 gives an overview of the safety notions (both formally and informally) and the assumptions
made about the robot and the obstacle in the models. We consider all four models and safety properties
to show the differences between the assumed knowledge and the safety guarantees that can be made. The
7The robot ensures that there is enough room for the obstacle to stop before a collision occurs. If the obstacle decides not to, the
obstacle is to blame and our robot is still considered safe.
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verification effort and complexity difference is quite instructive. Static safety provides a strong guarantee
with a simple safety proof, because only the robot moves. Passive safety can be guaranteed by proving safety
of all robot choices, whereas passive friendly safety additionally requires liveness proofs for the obstacle. In
the following sections, we discuss models and verification of the dynamic window algorithm in detail.
For the sake of clarity, we will initially make the following simplifying assumptions to get an easier first
model:
• in its decisions, the robot will assume it uses maximum braking or maximum acceleration,
• the robot will not be able to reverse its direction, but only drive smooth curves in forward direction,
and
• the robot will not keep track of the center of the circle around which its current arc is taking it, but
choose steering through picking a curve radius
In Section 7 we will see how to avoid these simplifications.
The subsections here are structured as follows: we first discuss the rationale behind the model (see
paragraphs Modeling) and give an intuition why the control choices in this model are safe (see paragraphs
Identification of Safe Controls). Finally, we verify the correctness of the model formally, i. e., we use the
model in a correctness theorem and sketch a proof that the control choices indeed guarantee the model
to satisfy the static safety condition (see paragraphs Verification). Whether or not the model adequately
represents reality is a complementary question that we will discuss in Section 10.
6.1 Static Safety with Maximum Acceleration
In environments with only stationary obstacles, static safety ensures that the robot will never collide.
Modeling The prerequisite for obtaining a formal safety result is to first formalize the system model
in addition to its desired safety property. We develop a model of the principles in the dynamic window
algorithm as a hybrid program, and express static safety as a safety property in dL.
obstacle po
po
stopping distance area robot pr
curve center pc
Figure 3: Illustration of static safety: the robot must stop before reaching the closest obstacle on a curve
(two of infinitely many curves illustrated). We abstract non-point obstacles to points by considering the
perimeter point being closest to the robot. A conservative simplification is to ignore the curves of the robot
and use a safety zone of the size of its stopping distance instead (dotted circle).
The dynamic window algorithm uses the distance to the nearest obstacle for every possible curve to
determine admissible velocities (e. g., compute distances in a loop and pick the obstacle with the smallest).
Our model exploits the power of nondeterminism to model this concisely. It nondeterministically picks any
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obstacle po := (∗, ∗) and tests its safety. Since the choice of the obstacle to consider was nondeterministic
and the model is only safe if it is safe for all possible ways of selecting any obstacle nondeterministically,
this includes safety for the nearest obstacle (ties are included) and is thus safe for all possible obstacles. A
QdL model with explicit representations of multiple obstacles will be considered in Section 7.5. In the case
of non-point obstacles, po denotes the obstacle perimeter point that is closest to the robot (this fits naturally
to obstacle point sets delivered by radar and Lidar sensors, from which the closest point will be chosen).
In each controller run of the robot, the position po is updated nondeterministically (again to consider any
obstacle including the ones that are now closest). In this process, the robot may or may not find another safe
trajectory. If it does, the robot can follow that new safe trajectory w.r.t. any nondeterministically chosen
obstacle. If not, the robot can still brake on the previous trajectory, which was previously shown to be safe.
Model 1 Dynamic window with static safety
dwps ≡ (ctrlr; dyn)∗ (1)
ctrlr ≡ (ar :=−b) (2)
∪ (?vr = 0; ar := 0; ωr := 0) (3)
∪ (ar :=A; ωr := ∗; ?−Ω ≤ ωr ≤ Ω; (4)
rc := ∗; po := (∗, ∗); ?curve ∧ safe) (5)
curve ≡ rc 6= 0 ∧ rcωr = vr (6)
safe ≡ ‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b
+
(
A
b
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + εvr
)
(7)
dyn ≡ t := 0; {t′ = 1, pr′ = vrdr, v′r = ar, (8)
d′r = ωrd
⊥
r , ω
′
r =
ar
rc
(9)
& vr ≥ 0 ∧ t ≤ ε} (10)
Model 1 represents the common controller-plant model: it repeatedly executes the robot control choices
followed by dynamics, cf. (1). The continuous dynamics of the robot as presented in Section 5 above are
defined in (8)–(10) of Model 1. The rest describes the discrete control. For the sake of clarity we restrict
the study to circular trajectories with non-zero radius (that is rc 6= 0 so that the robot is not spinning on
the spot), where straight-line trajectories correspond to infinite rc. The sign of the radius signifies if the
robot follows the curve in clockwise (rc < 0) or in counter-clockwise direction (rc > 0). Since rc 6= 0, the
condition (rcωr)′ = ar can be rewritten as ω′r = arrc .
The robot is allowed to brake at all times since the assignment that assigns full braking to ar in (2) has
no test. If the robot is stopped, it may choose to stay in its current spot without turning, cf. (3). Finally, if
it is safe to accelerate, the robot may choose a new safe curve in its dynamic window: it chooses maximum
acceleration, and any rotational velocity in the bounds, cf. (4). This corresponds to testing all possible
rotational velocity values at the same time. An implementation in an imperative language would use loops
to enumerate all possible values and all obstacles and test each pair (vr, ωr) separately w.r.t. every obstacle,
storing the admissible pairs in a data structure (as e. g., in [37]).
The curve is determined by the robot following a circular trajectory of radius rc, starting in initial
direction dr with angular velocity ωr, cf. (5). The distance to the nearest obstacle on that curve is measured
through po := (∗, ∗) in (5). The trajectory starts at pr with translational velocity vr and rotational velocity
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ωr, as defined by rcωr = vr in (6). Together with the orientation dr of the robot, which is tangential to
the curve, this implicitly defines the rotation center pc; see Fig. 3. We will explicitly represent the rotation
center in later models for more aggressive maneuvering; for starters, here, we only need to know how to
steer through rc.
Identification of Safe Controls Based on this shape of the model, its most critical element is the formula
safe that we identify as the condition that control choices need to satisfy in order to always keep the robot
safe. While its ultimate justification will be the safety proof (Theorem 1), this section develops an intuitive
explanation why we chose the particular design in (7).
A circular trajectory of radius rc ensures static safety if it allows the robot to stop before it collides with
the nearest obstacle. Consider the extreme case where the radius rc = ∞ is infinitely large and the robot,
thus, travels on a straight line. In this case, the distance between the robot’s current position pr and the
nearest obstacle po must account for the following components: First, the robot needs to be able to brake
from its current velocity vr to a complete stop:
v2r
2b =
∫ vr/b
0
(vr − bt)dt . (11)
Second, it may take up to ε time until the robot can take the next control decision. Thus, we must
additionally take into account the distance that the robot may travel w.r.t. the maximum acceleration A and
the distance needed for compensating its acceleration of A during that reaction time with braking power b:
(
A
b + 1
) (
A
2 ε
2 + εvr
)
=
∫ ε
0
(vr +At)dt+
∫ Aε/b
0
(vr +Aε− bt)dt . (12)
The safety distance chosen for safe in (7) of Model 1 is the sum of the distances (11) and (12). The
safety proof will have to show that this construction was safe and that it is also safe for all other curved
trajectories that the obstacle and robot could be taking instead.
To simplify the proof’s arithmetic, we measure the distance between the robot’s position pr and the
obstacle’s position po in the infinity-norm ‖pr−po‖∞, i. e., either |pxr −pxo | or |pyr −pyo| must be safe. In the
illustrations, this corresponds to replacing the circles representing reachable areas with squares. We, thus,
over-approximate the Euclidean norm distance ‖pr − po‖2 =
√
(pxr − pxo)2 + (pyr − pyo)2 by a factor of at
most
√
2.
Verification We verify the safety of the control algorithm modeled as a hybrid program in Model 1, using
a formal proof calculus for dL [23, 25, 30]. The robot is safe, if it maintains positive distance ‖pr−po‖ > 0
to all obstacles (see Table 4):
ψss ≡ ‖pr − po‖ > 0 . (13)
In order to guarantee ψss, the robot must stay at a safe distance, which still allows the robot to brake to a
complete stop before hitting any obstacle. The following condition captures this requirement as an invariant
ϕss that we prove to hold for all loop executions:
ϕss ≡ ‖pr − po‖ > v
2
r
2b
. (14)
The formula (14) says that the robot and the obstacle are safely apart. In this case, the invariant coincides
with condition (11), which describes the stopping distance.
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We prove that the property (13) holds for all executions of Model 1 under the assumption that we start
in a state satisfying the following conditions:8
φss ≡ vr = 0 ∧ rc 6= 0 ∧ ‖dr‖ = 1 . (15)
The first condition of the conjunction formalizes that the robot is stopped initially. Note, that any other
formula φss implying the invariant ϕss is a valid starting condition as well. The second conjunct states that
the robot is not spinning initially. The last conjunct ‖dr‖ = 1 says that the direction dr is a unit vector.
Theorem 1 (Static safety). If the robot starts in a state where φss (15) holds, then the control model dwss
(Model 1) always guarantees the static safety condition ψss (13), as expressed by the provable dL formula
φss → [dwss]ψss .
We proved Theorem 1 for circular trajectories using KeYmaera [34], a theorem prover for hybrid sys-
tems. The proof uses the invariant ϕss (14) for handling the loop. It uses differential invariants (16)–(20)—
an induction principle for differential equations [31]—to prove properties about dyn without relying on
symbolic solutions.
ηss ≡ t ≥ 0 (16)
∧ ‖dr‖ = 1 (17)
∧ vr = old(vr) + art (18)
∧ −t
(
vr − ar
2
t
)
≤ pxr − old(pxr ) ≤ t
(
vr − ar
2
t
)
(19)
∧ −t
(
vr − ar
2
t
)
≤ pyr − old(pyr) ≤ t
(
vr − ar
2
t
)
(20)
The differential invariants capture that time progresses (16), that the orientation stays a unit vector (17),
that the new speed vr is determined by the previous speed old(vr)9 and the acceleration ar (18), and that the
robot does not leave the bounding square of half side length t(vr− ar2 t) around its previous position old(pr)
(19)–(20).
6.2 Passive Safety with Maximum Acceleration
Passive safety considers the robot safe if it is able to come to a full stop before making contact with an
obstacle. When every moving robot and obstacle follows passive safety then there will be no collisions.
Otherwise, i. e., if careless or malicious obstacles are moving in the environment, passive safety ensures that
at least our own robot is stopped so that collision impact is kept small. In this section, we will develop a
robot controller that provably ensures passive safety. In this section, we remove the restriction that obstacles
cannot move, but keep the remaining simplifying assumptions from the beginning ofSection 6:
• in its decisions, the robot will assume it uses maximum braking or maximum acceleration,
• the robot will not be able to reverse its direction, but only drive smooth curves in forward direction,
8The formal proof uses the parameter constraints stated earlier, A ≥ 0, V ≥ 0, Ω ≥ 0, b > 0, and ε > 0, which we leave out
for simplicity.
9The function old(·) is shorthand notation for an auxiliary variable that is initialized to the value of · before the ODE.
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Model 2 Dynamic window with passive safety
dwps ≡ (ctrlo; ctrlr; dyn)∗ (21)
ctrlo ≡ vo := (∗, ∗); ?‖vo‖ ≤ V (22)
ctrlr ≡ (ar :=−b) (23)
∪ (?vr = 0; ar := 0; ωr := 0) (24)
∪ (ar :=A; ωr := ∗; ?−Ω ≤ ωr ≤ Ω; rc := ∗; po := (∗, ∗); ?curve ∧ safe) (25)
curve ≡ rc 6= 0 ∧ rcωr = vr (26)
safe ≡ ‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b
+ V
vr
b
+
(
A
b
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + ε(vr + V )
)
(27)
dyn ≡ t := 0; {t′ = 1, p′o = vo, , p′r = vrdr, v′r = ar, d′r = ωrd⊥r , ω′r =
ar
rc
& vr ≥ 0 ∧ t ≤ ε} (28)
• the robot will not keep track of the center of the circle around which its current arc is taking it, but
choose steering through picking a curve radius, and
• obstacles can move, but the robot and the obstacle will decide on their next maneuver at the same
time.
obstacle reach area
until robot stopped
obstacle po
stopping distance area robot pr
curve center pc
Figure 4: Illustration of passive safety: the area reachable by the robot until it can stop must not overlap
with the area reachable by the obstacle during that time.
Modeling We develop a model of the principles in the dynamic window algorithm as a hybrid program,
and express passive safety as a safety property in dL. As stated above, the dynamic window algorithm
uses the distance to the nearest obstacle for every possible curve to determine admissible velocities. In
the presence of moving obstacles, however, all obstacles must be considered and tested for safety (e. g., in
a loop). Again, our model exploits the power of nondeterminism to model this concisely by picking any
obstacle po := (∗, ∗) and testing its safety. In each controller run of the robot, the position po is updated
nondeterministically (again to consider any obstacle including the ones that are now closest because the
robot as well as the obstacles moved). In this process, the robot may or may not find another safe trajectory.
If it does, the robot can follow that new safe trajectory w.r.t. any nondeterministically chosen obstacle (again,
V ensures that all other obstacles will stay more distant than the worst case of the nearest). If not, the robot
can still brake on the previous trajectory, which was previously shown to be safe.
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Model 2 follows a setup similar to Model 1. The continuous dynamics of the robot and the obstacle as
presented in Section 5 above are defined in (28) of Model 2. Model 2 still focuses on circular arcs of non-
zero radius. We have made proofs for corresponding dynamics for spinning behavior (rc = 0, ωr 6= 0) and
Archimedean spiral (ω′r = 0, ar 6= 0) available with KeYmaera as well, but do not discuss them here.
The control of the robot is executed after the control of the obstacle, cf. (21). Note, that both robot and
obstacle only write to variables that are read in the plant, but not in the controller of the respective other
agent. Therefore, we could swap the controllers to ctrlr; ctrlo, or even more liberal use a nondeterministic
choice of (ctrlo; ctrlr) ∪ (ctrlr; ctrlo), which resembles parallel execution of controllers (see [21] for more
details on this technique). Deciding on one specific ordering (here: ctrlo; ctrlr) reduces proof effort.
The obstacle itself may choose any velocity in any direction up to the maximum velocity V assumed
about obstacles (‖vo‖ ≤ V ), cf. (22). This uses the modeling pattern from Section 3: we assign an arbitrary
(two-dimensional) value to the obstacle’s velocity (vo := (∗, ∗)), which is then restricted to any value up to
the maximum velocity using a subsequent test (?‖vo‖ ≤ V ). Overall, (22) allows obstacles to choose an
arbitrary velocity in any direction, but at most as fast as V .
The robot follows the same three control choices as in Model 1, see (23)–(25). The main difference to
Model 1 is the condition (27), which now has to account for the fact that obstacles may move while the robot
tries to avoid collision.
Identification of Safe Controls Based on this shape of the model, again the most critical element is the
formula safe that we identify as the condition that control choices need to satisfy in order to always keep
the robot safe. Here, we extend the intuitive explanation from 6.1 on page 15 to account for the additional
obstacle terms in (27).
A circular trajectory of radius rc ensures passive safety if it allows the robot to stop before it collides
with the nearest obstacle. We again consider the extreme case where the radius rc = ∞ is infinitely large
and the robot, thus, travels on a straight line. In addition to the stopping distance v
2
r
2B (11) and the distance for
compensating acceleration
(
A
b + 1
) (
A
2 ε
2 + εvr
) (12), the distance between the robot’s current position pr
and the nearest obstacle po must account for the motion of the obstacle. During the stopping time (ε+ vr+Aεb )
entailed by (11) and (12), the obstacle might approach the robot on a straight line with maximum velocity
V to the point of collision:
V
(
ε+
vr +Aε
b
)
= V
(
vr
b
+
(
A
b
+ 1
)
ε
)
. (29)
The safety distance chosen for safe in (27) of Model 2 is the sum of the distances (11), (12), and (29).
The safety proof will have to show that this construction was safe and that it is also safe for all other curved
trajectories that the obstacle and robot could be taking instead.
Verification We verify the safety of the control algorithm modeled as a hybrid program in Model 2, using
a formal proof calculus for dL [23, 25, 30]. The robot is safe, if it maintains positive distance ‖pr−po‖ > 0
to the obstacle while the robot is driving (see Table 4):
ψps ≡ vr 6= 0→ (‖pr − po‖ > 0) . (30)
In order to guarantee ψps, the robot must stay at a safe distance, which still allows the robot to brake to
a complete stop before the approaching obstacle reaches the robot. The following condition captures this
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requirement as an invariant ϕps that we prove to hold for all loop executions:
ϕps ≡ vr 6= 0→
(
‖pr − po‖ > v
2
r
2b
+ V
vr
b
)
. (31)
Formula (31) says that, while the robot is driving, the positions of the robot and the obstacle are safely
apart. This accounts for the robot’s braking distance v
2
r
2b while the obstacle is allowed to approach the robot
with its fastest travel distance V vrb . We prove that the property (30) holds for all executions of Model 2
under the assumption that we start in a state satisfying the following conditions:10
φps ≡ vr = 0 ∧ rc 6= 0 ∧ ‖dr‖ = 1 . (32)
The first condition of the conjunction formalizes that the robot is stopped initially, whereas the second
conjunct states that the robot is not spinning. The last conjunct ‖dr‖ = 1 says that the direction dr is a unit
vector. Again, any other condition φps such that φps → ϕps holds would work as well.
Theorem 2 (Passive safety). If the robot starts in a state where φps (32) holds, then the control model dwps
(Model 2) always guarantees the passive safety condition ψps (30), as expressed by the provable dL formula
φps → [dwps]ψps .
We proved Theorem 2 for circular trajectories, spinning, and spiral trajectories using KeYmaera [34],
a theorem prover for hybrid systems. The proof uses the invariant ϕps (31). It extends the differential
invariants (16)–(20) for static safety with invariants about obstacle motion: similar to the robot, the obstacle
does not leave its bounding square of half side length tV around its previous position old(po) (33)–(34)
ηps ≡ ηss ∧−tV ≤ pxo − old(pxo) ≤ tV (33)
∧−tV ≤ pyo − old(pyo) ≤ tV (34)
In the next section, we explore the stronger requirements of passive friendly safety, where the robot not
only stops safely itself, but also allows for the obstacle to stop before a collision occurs.
6.3 Passive Friendly Safety of Obstacle Avoidance
Passive friendly safety, as introduced above, requires the robot to take careful decisions that respect the
features of moving obstacles. The intuition behind passive friendly safety is that our own robot should
retain space for careless obstacles. Passive friendly safety ensures that there will not be collisions, as long
as every obstacle makes an effort of stopping to avoid collision when it sees the robot, even when some
obstacles approach intersections carelessly and turn around corners without looking first. The definition of
Macˇek et al. [17] requires that the robot respects the worst-case braking time of the obstacle. In our model,
the worst-case braking time is represented as follows. We assume an upper bound τ on the reaction time
of the obstacle and a lower bound bo on its braking capabilities. Then, τV is the maximal distance that the
obstacle can travel before actually reacting and V 22bo is the distance for the obstacle to stop from the maximal
velocity V with an assumed minimum braking capability bo.
10The formal proof uses the parameter constraints stated earlier, vr ≥ 0, A ≥ 0, V ≥ 0, Ω ≥ 0, b > 0, and ε > 0, which we
leave out for simplicity.
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Modeling Model 3 uses the same obstacle avoidance algorithm as Model 2. The essential difference re-
flects what the robot considers to be a safe distance to an obstacle. As shown in (36) the distance not only
accounts for the robot’s own braking distance, but also for the braking distance V 22bo and reaction time τ of the
obstacle. The verification of passive friendly safety is more complicated than passive safety as it accounts
for the behavior of the obstacle discussed below.
Model 3 Dynamic window with passive friendly safety
dwpfs ≡ (ctrl; dyn)∗ (see Model 2 for details) (35)
safe ≡ ‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b
+ V
vr
b
+
V 2
2bo
+ τV +
(
A
b
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + ε(vr + V )
)
(36)
Verification We verify the safety of the robot’s control choices as modeled in Model 3. Unlike the passive
safety case, the passive friendly safety property φpfs should guarantee that if the robot stops, moving obsta-
cles (cf. Model 4) still have enough time and space to avoid a collision. This requirement can be captured
by the following dL formula:
ηpfs ≡
(
(vr = 0) ∧ ηobs ∧ (0 ≤ vo ≤ V )
)→ 〈obstacle〉 (‖pr − po‖ > 0 ∧ vo = 0) (37)
where the property ηobs accounts for the stopping distance of the obstacle:
ηobs ≡ ‖pr − po‖ > V
2
2bo
+ τV .
Formula (37) says that, once the robot stops (vr = 0), there exists an execution of the hybrid program
obstacle, (existence of a run is formalized by the diamond operator 〈obstacle〉), that allows the obstacle to
stop (vo = 0) without colliding (‖pr − po‖ > 0). Passive friendly safety ψpfs is now stated as
ψpfs ≡ ηobs ∧ ηpfs .
We study passive friendly safety with respect to the initial feasible states satisfying the following property:
φpfs ≡ ηobs ∧ rc 6= 0 ∧ ‖dr‖ = 1 . (38)
Observe that, in addition to the condition ηpfs, the difference with the passive safety condition is reflected
in the special treatment of the case vr = 0. Indeed, if the robot would start with translational velocity
vr = 0 (which is passive safety) while not satisfying ηobs, then we cannot prove passive friendly safety as
the obstacle may be unsafely close already initially. Besides, we can see in ψpfs that we are required to prove
ηpfs even when the robot comes to a full stop.
In Model 3 the hybrid program ctrlo is a coarse model given by equation (22), which only constrains its
non-negative velocity to be less than or equal to V . Such an obstacle could trivially prevent a collision by
stopping instantaneously, and is, thus, a trivial obstacle model to consider for passive friendly safety. In ηpfs,
we, instead, consider a more interesting refined obstacle behavior modeled by the hybrid program given in
Model 4.
The refined obstacle may choose any direction as described by the unit vector do in (40) and any accel-
eration ao, as long as it does not exceed the velocity bound V . The dynamics of the obstacle are straight
ideal-world translational motion in the two-dimensional plane, see (41).
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Model 4 Refined obstacle with acceleration control
obstacle ≡ (ctrlo˜; dyno˜)∗ (39)
ctrlo˜ ≡ do := (∗, ∗); ?‖do‖ = 1; ao := ∗; ?vo + aoεo ≤ V (40)
dyno˜ ≡ t := 0; {t′ = 1, p′o = vodo, v′o = ao & t ≤ εo ∧ vo ≥ 0} (41)
Theorem 3 (Passive friendly safety). If the property φpfs (38) holds initially, then the control model dwpfs
(Model 3), guarantees the passive friendly safety condition ψpfs in presence of obstacles per Model 4, as
expressed by the provable dL formula
φpfs → [dwpfs]ψpfs .
We verified Theorem 3 in KeYmaera. The symbolic bounds on velocity, acceleration, braking, and time
in the above models represent uncertainty implicitly (e. g., the braking power b can be instantiated with the
minimum specification of the robot’s brakes, or with the actual braking power achievable w.r.t. the current
terrain). Dually, whenever knowledge about the current state is available, the bounds can be instantiated
more aggressively to allow efficient robot behavior. For example, in a rare worst case we may face a
particularly fast obstacle, but right now there are only slow-moving obstacles around. Theorems 2–3 are
verified for all those values. Section 7.5 illustrates how to explicitly model different kinds of obstacles in a
single model. Other aspects of uncertainty need explicit changes in the models and proofs, as discussed in
the next section.
6.4 Passive Orientation Safety
So far, we did not consider orientation as part of the safety specification. The notion of passive safety
requires the robot to stop to avoid imminent collision, which can be inefficient or even impossible when
sensor coverage is not exhaustive. For example, if an obstacle is close behind the robot (cf. Fig. 5a), the
robot would have to stop to guarantee passive safety, while it could choose a new curve that leads away from
the obstacle with a more liberal safety notion.
We introduce passive orientation safety that only requires the robot to remain safe with respect to the
obstacles in its orientation of responsibility. Overall system safety depends on the sensor coverage of the
robot and the obstacles. For example, if two robots drive side-by-side with only very narrow sensor coverage
to the front, they still might collide when their paths cross. Even with limited sensor coverage, if both robots
can observe some separation markers in space (e. g., lane markers) that keeps their paths separated, then
passive orientation safety ensures that there will not be collisions. Likewise, passive orientation safety
ensures that there will not be collisions when every robot and obstacle covers 180◦ in its orientation of
responsibility, i. e., it can observe its vicinity to the front, but not to the rear.
This notion of safety is suitable for structured spaces where obstacles can easily determine the trajectory
and observable region of the robot (e. g., lanes on streets). The robot is responsible for collisions inside its
observable area (“field of vision”, cf. Fig. 5b) and has to ensure that it can stop if needed before leaving the
observable region (cf. Fig. 5c), because it could otherwise cause collisions when moving into the blind spot
just outside its observable area. However, the robot does not make guarantees for obstacles that it cannot
see. If an obstacle starts outside the observable region and subsequently hits the robot, then it is considered
the fault of the obstacle. If the robot guarantees passive orientation safety and every obstacle outside the
observable region guarantees that it will not interfere with the robot, a collision between the robot and an
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obstacle area
obstacle po
area reachable
by robot
robot pr
curve center pc
(a) Passive safety without orientation: the
robot cannot choose a new curve if both
the robot area and the trajectory overlap
with the obstacle area, even if that curve
leads away from the obstacle behind.
ignored obsta-
cle area
invisible po
relevant obsta-
cle area
visible po
area reachable
by robot
robot pr
curve center pc
(b) The area observable by the robot (circular sector centered at robot):
the distance to all visible obstacles must be safe. Obstacles outside the
visible area are responsible for avoiding collision with the robot until
they become visible, i. e., obstacles are assumed to not blindside the
robot.
invisible po
observable area
robot pr
curve center pc
(c) An obstacle might sit on the robot’s curve just outside the observable area. Thus, the robot must ensure that it can
stop inside its current observable area, since starting to brake when the obstacle becomes visible might be too late.
Figure 5: Passive orientation safety compared to passive safety without orientation
obstacle never happens while the robot is moving. In fact, collisions can be avoided when obstacles do not
cross the trajectory of the robot. Any obstacles inside the observable region can drive with passive safety
restrictions (i. e., guarantee not to exceed a maximum velocity) because the robot will brake or choose a
new curve to avoid collisions. Obstacles that start outside the observable region can rely on the robot to stay
inside its observable region, and that it guarantees collision avoidance for the obstacles it can see. Also, it
guarantees to only enter places it can see (i. e. the robot will stop before it drives to places that it did not see
when evaluating the safety of a curve).
Modeling To express that an obstacle was invisible to the robot when it chose a new curve we introduce the
non-rigid function Visible, with Visible > 0 indicating that the obstacle was visible to the robot when it chose
a new curve. The observable region is aligned with the orientation of the robot and extends symmetrically
by a constant design parameter γ that captures the angular width of the field of vision: The robot can see
everything within angle γ2 to its left or right. With the newly introduced notions, the safety condition to
guarantee passive orientation safety can be expressed in QdL as follows:
ψpos ≡ vr 6= 0→
(‖pr − po‖ > 0 ∨ (Visible ≤ 0 ∧ |β| < γ)) (42)
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observable area
curve exit
κ
λ
β
robot pr
γ
2
dr
curve center pc
Figure 6: Determining the point where the curve exits the observable region of angular width γ by keeping
track of the angular progress β along the curve: κ = 90◦ − γ2 because γ extends equally to both sides of the
orientation dr , which is perpendicular to the line from the robot to pc (because dr is tangential to the curve).
λ = κ because the triangle is isosceles. Thus, β = 180◦ − κ− λ = γ at exactly the moment when the robot
would leave the observable region.
This means that, when the robot is driving, every obstacle is either sufficiently far away or it came from
outside the observable region while the robot stayed inside. For determining whether or not the robot stayed
inside the observable region, we compare the angular progress β along the curve with the angular width γ
of the observable region, see Fig. 6 for details. The angular progress β is reset to zero each time the robot
chooses a new curve in (44) and evolves according to β′ = ωr when the robot moves (50). Thus, β always
holds the value of the angle on the current curve between the current position of the robot and its position
when it chose the curve. Note that passive safety is a special case of passive orientation safety for γ =∞.11
The new robot controller now only takes obstacles in its observable region into account when computing
the safety of a new curve in safe (48). It chooses curves such that it can stop before leaving the observable
region, i. e. it ensures a clear distance ahead (cda): such a curve is characterized by the braking distance of
the robot being less than γ · |r|, which is the length of the arc between the starting position when choosing
the curve and the position where the robot would leave the observable region, cf. Fig. 6. When the robot
successfully chooses a new curve (44), the status of the obstacle (i. e. whether or not it is visible) is stored
in Visible so that the visibility state is available when checking the safety property.
Verification We formalize passive orientation safety in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 (Passive orientation safety). When started in an initially passive-orientation-safe state, the model
dwpos (Model 5) ensures passive orientation safety:
φpos → [dwpos]ψpos .
We proved Theorem 4, i. e., that Model 5 is safe with respect to passive orientation safety.
7 Refined Models for Safety Verification
So far, the models used for safety verification made several simplifying assumptions to focus on the basics
of different safety notions. In this section, we discuss how to create more realistic models with actual
11Passive orientation safety restricts admissible curves to those where the robot can stop before |β| > γ and the model does not
take advantage of the fact that 360◦ subsumes unrestricted visibility.
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Model 5 Passive orientation safety
dwpos ≡ (ctrlo; ctrlr; dyn)∗ (43)
ctrlr ≡ (ar :=−b)
∪ (?vr = 0; ar := 0; ωr := 0)
∪ (ar :=A; ωr := ∗; ?− Ω ≤ ωr ≤ Ω; (44)
rc := ∗; po := (∗, ∗); Visible := ∗; (45)
?curve ∧ safe ∧ cda); (46)
curve ≡ rc 6= 0 ∧ rcωr = vr (47)
safe ≡ Visible > 0→ ‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b
+ V
vr
b
+
(
A
b
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + ε(vr + V )
)
(48)
cda ≡ γ|r| > v
2
r
2b
+
(
A
b
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + εvr
)
(49)
dyn ≡ t := 0; β := 0; (50)
{p′r = vrdr, d′r = ωrd⊥r , v′r = ar, β′ = ωr, ω′r =
ar
r
, p′o = vo, t
′ = 1 & vr ≥ 0 ∧ t ≤ ε} (51)
acceleration, distance measurement along the trajectory, measurement uncertainty and actuator disturbance,
non-synchronized control of obstacle and robot, and explicit representation of arbitrary many obstacles. We
introduce the model extensions for passive safety as an example. The extensions apply to the other safety
notions in a similar fashion.
7.1 Passive Safety with Actual Acceleration
Model 2 uses the robot’s maximum acceleration in its safety requirement (27) when it determines whether
or not a new curve will be safe. This condition is conservative, since the robot can only decide between
maximum acceleration or maximum braking. If (27) does not hold (which is independent from the chosen
curve, i. e. the radius rc), then Model 2 forces a driving robot to brake with maximum deceleration −b, even
if it might be safe to just slightly brake or just not accelerate in full. As a result, Model 2 lacks efficiency in
that it may take the robot longer to reach a goal because it has to make extreme choices. Besides efficiency
concerns, extreme choices can be undesirable for comfort reasons (e. g., decelerating a car braking with full
power should be reserved for emergency cases).
Fig. 7 illustrates how safety constraint (27) represents the maximally conservative choice: it forces the
robot to brake (the outermost circle around the robot pr intersects with the obstacle), even though many
points reachable with −b ≤ ar < A are still safe (solid blue area does not intersect with the obstacle).
Modeling Model 6 adapts Model 2 to actual acceleration, i. e., in (56) the robot chooses any acceleration
in the physical limits −b ≤ ar ≤ A instead of just maximum acceleration.
This change requires us to adapt the control condition (59) that keeps the robot safe. The next paragraph
first gives the intuition behind condition (59), before in 7.1 we ultimately justify its correctness with a safety
proof.
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obstacle area
obstacle po
unsafe accelerations ≤ A
maximum braking −b safe accelerations
robot pr
curve center pc
Figure 7: Passive safety with actual acceleration: the actual acceleration choice −b ≤ ar ≤ A must not take
the robot into the area reachable by the obstacle. Dotted circle around robot position pr: earliest possible
stop with maximum braking −b; solid blue area between dotted circle and dashed area: safe ar; dashed area:
reachable with unsafe accelerations.
Model 6 Passive safety with actual acceleration
dwpsa ≡ (ctrlo; ctrlr; dyn)∗ (52)
ctrlo ≡ see Model 2 (53)
ctrlr ≡ (ar :=−b) (54)
∪ (?vr = 0; ar := 0; ωr := 0) (55)
∪ (ar := ∗; ?− b ≤ ar ≤ A; ωr := ∗; ?−Ω ≤ ωr ≤ Ω; (56)
rc := ∗; po := (∗, ∗); ?curve ∧ safe) (57)
curve ≡ see Model 2 (58)
safe ≡ ‖pr − po‖∞ >
{
dist≥ if vr + arε ≥ 0
dist< otherwise
(59)
dyn ≡ see Model 2 (60)
Identification of Safe Constraints Here, we follow [16] to relax constraint (27) so that the robot can
choose any acceleration −b ≤ ar ≤ A and checks this actual acceleration for safety. That way, it only has to
fall back to the emergency braking branch ar :=−b if there is no other safe choice available. We distinguish
two cases:
• vr + arε ≥ 0: All acceleration choices −b ≤ ar ≤ A keep a nonnegative velocity if followed for the
full cycle duration ε.
• vr + arε < 0: Some acceleration choice −b ≤ ar < 0 cannot be followed for the full duration ε
without stopping the evolution to prevent a negative velocity.
In the first case we continue to use formula (27) with actual ar substituted for A to compute the safety
distance:
dist≥ =
v2r
2b
+ V
vr
b
+
(ar
b
+ 1
)(ar
2
ε2 + ε(vr + V )
)
(61)
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In the second case, distance (61) is unsafe, because the terminal velocity when following ar for ε time
is negative (unlike case 1). Thus, the robot may have collided at a time before ε, while the term in (61)
only indicates that it will no longer be in a collision state at time ε. Consider the time tb when the robot’s
velocity becomes zero (vr + artb = 0) so that its physics stops (recall that braking does not make the robot
move backwards but merely stop). Hence, tb = − vrar since the first case applies for ar = 0. In duration
tb the robot will drive a total distance of distr = − v
2
r
2ar
=
∫ tb
0 (vr + art)dt. The obstacle may drive up to
disto = V tb until the robot is stopped. Thus, we compute distance using (62) to account for the worst case
that both robot and obstacle drive directly towards each other (note that −b ≤ ar < 0).
dist< = − v
2
r
2ar
− V vr
ar
(62)
Verification We verify the safety of the control algorithm as modeled in Model 6 in the dL proof calculus.
Theorem 5 (Passive safety with actual acceleration). If the robot starts in a state where φps (32) holds, then
the control model dwpsa (Model 6) guarantees the passive safety condition ψps (30), as expressed by the
provable dL formula
φps → [dwpsa]ψps .
We proved Theorem 5 in KeYmaera.
7.2 Passive Safety with Trajectory Distance Measurement
Models 2 and 6 used a safety distance in infinity norm for the safety constraints, which grossly overapprox-
imates the actual trajectory of the robot by a box around the robot. For example, recall the safety distance
(27) of Model 2
‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b
+ V
vr
b
+
(
A
b
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + ε(vr + V )
)
,
which needs to be large enough in either one axis, irrespective of the actual trajectory that the robot will be
taking. This constraint can be inefficient when the robot chooses a trajectory that will keep it close to its
current position (e. g., when driving along a small circle). For example, a robot with constant velocity vr = 4
and reaction time ε = 1 will traverse a small circle with radius r = 1pi and corresponding circumference
2pir = 2 twice within time ε. So far, the safety constraint required the total distance of 4 as a safety distance
between the robot and the obstacle, because it overapproximated its actual trajectory by a box. However,
the robot actually never moves away more than 2pi from its original position because it moves on a circle (cf.
Fig. 8a).
Modeling We change the robot controller to improve its efficiency. One choice would be to explicitly
express circular motion in terms of sine and cosine and then compute all possible positions of the robot
explicitly. However, besides being vastly inefficient in a real controller, this introduces transcendental func-
tions and would leave the decidable part of the arithmetic of real-closed fields [25]. Hence, we will use
the distance of the obstacle to the trajectory itself in the control conditions. Such a distance computation
requires that we adapt the constraint curve (70) to express the curve center explicitly. So far, the curve was
uniquely determined by the radius rc and the orientation dr of the robot. Now that we need the curve center
explicitly for distance calculation to the obstacle, we have to choose the curve center pc such that
• (pr − pc) is perpendicular to the robot orientation dr , i. e., dr is tangential to the curve, and
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• located correctly to the left or right of the robot, so that it fits to the clockwise or counter-clockwise
motion as signified by rc.
Thus, the condition curve (70) now checks if the chosen curve and the direction of the robot are consistent,
i. e., |rc| = ‖pr − pc‖ and dr = (pr−pc)
⊥
rc
must hold. Additionally, we augment the robot with a capability
to turn around in place when stopped (vr = 0). For this, (67) is extended with a choice of either turning
around (dr := −dr) or remaining oriented as is (dr := dr), and the corresponding choice of a curve center
pc such that the curve variables remain consistent according to the subsequent test ?curve.
Identification of Safe Controls With the changes in distance measurement introduced above, we now
relax the control conditions that keep the robot safe. The distance of the obstacle to the trajectory can be
described with the following two components:
1. Calculate the distance of the obstacle to the circle: ||rc| − ‖po − pc‖|, which is the distance between
the obstacle and the circle center minus the radius.
2. Calculate the maximum distance that the obstacle can drive until the robot comes to a stop. This
distance is equal to the distances calculated in the previous models, i. e. in the case vr + arε ≤ 0 it is
−V vrar and in the case vr + arε ≥ 0 it is V
(
ε+ vr+arεb
)
.
If the distance between the obstacle and the circle describing the robot’s trajectory is greater than the
sum of those distances then the robot can stop before hitting the obstacle and, thus, choosing the new curve
is safe, which leads us to choose the following safety condition:
||rc| − ‖po − pc‖| >
{
V
(
ε+ vr+arεb
)
if vr + arε ≥ 0
−V vrar otherwise
(63)
We use condition (63), which now uses the Euclidean norm, for choosing a new curve in Model 7.
With this new constraint, the robot is allowed to choose the curve in Fig. 8a. However, constraint (63) has
drawbacks when the trajectory of the robot is slow along a large circle and the obstacle is close to the circle,
as illustrated in Fig. 8b. In this case the robot is only allowed to choose very small accelerations because
the obstacle is very close to the circle. A disjunction of constraints (59) and (63) provides the best of both
worlds, see (71).
Verification We verify the safety of the robot’s control choices as modeled in Model 7 in the dL proof
calculus.
Theorem 6 (Passive safety with trajectory distance measurement). If the property φps holds initially, then
the model dwpsdm (Model 7) guarantees passive safety, as expressed by the provable dL formula
φps → [dwpsdm]ψps .
We proved Theorem 6 with KeYmaera.
7.3 Passive Safety Despite Uncertainty
Robots have to deal with uncertainty in almost every aspect of their interaction with the environment, ranging
from sensor inputs (e. g., inaccurate localization, distance measurement) to actuator effects (e. g., wheel slip
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(a) Safe since the obstacle area does not overlap the
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Figure 8: Safe robot trajectories
depending on the terrain). In this section, we show how the three most important classes of uncertainty can
be handled explicitly in the models. First, we allow localization uncertainty, so that the robot knows its
position only approximately, which has a considerable impact on uncertainty over time. We then consider
imperfect actuator commands, which means that the effective physical braking and acceleration will differ
from the controller’s desired output. Finally, we allow velocity uncertainty, so the robot knows its velocity
only approximately. We use nondeterministic models of uncertainty as intervals around the real position,
acceleration, and velocity, without any probabilistic assumptions about their distribution.12 Such intervals
are instantiated, e. g., according to sensor or actuator specification (e. g., GPS error), or w.r.t. experimental
measurements.13
7.3.1 Location Uncertainty
Model 8 introduces location uncertainty. It adds a location measurement pˆr before the control decisions are
made such that the controller only bases its decisions on the most recent location measurement pˆr, which
can deviate from the true location pr. This location measurement may deviate from the real position pr by
no more than the symbolic parameter ∆p, cf. (74). The measured location pˆr is used in all control decisions
of the robot (e. g., in (75) to compute whether or not it is safe to change the curve), while the robot’s physical
motion is still computed on the symbolic real position pr.
Theorem 7 (Passive safety despite location uncertainty). If φps ∧ ∆p ≥ 0 holds initially, then the model
dwpslu (Model 8) guarantees passive safety, as expressed by the provable dL formula
φps ∧∆p ≥ 0→ [dwpslu]ψps .
We proved Theorem 7 in KeYmaera, so that the robot guarantees passive safety if it accounts for the
location uncertainty as stated in the safety constraint (75).
12Other error models are supported, as long as they are clipped to guaranteed intervals, because in the safety proof we have
to analyze all measured values, regardless of their probability. For an advanced analysis technique considering probabilities, see
stochastic dL [27].
13Instantiation with probabilistic bounds means that the symbolically guaranteed safety is traded for a safety probability.
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Model 7 Passive safety when considering the trajectory of the robot in distance measurement, extends
Model 6
dwpsdm ≡ (ctrlo; ctrlr; dyn)∗ (64)
ctrlo ≡ see Model 2 (65)
ctrlr ≡ (ar :=−b) (66)
∪ (?vr = 0; ar := 0; wr := 0; (dr :=−dr ∪ dr := dr) ; rc := ∗; pc := (∗, ∗); ?curve) (67)
∪ (ar := ∗; ?− b ≤ ar ≤ A; ωr := ∗; ?− Ω ≤ ωr ≤ Ω; (68)
rc := ∗; pc := (∗, ∗); po := (∗, ∗); ?curve ∧ safe) (69)
curve ≡ rc 6= 0 ∧ |rc| = ‖pr − pc‖ ∧ dr = (pr − pc)
⊥
rc
∧ rcωr = vr (70)
safe ≡
(
‖pr − po‖∞ >
{
dist≥ if vr + arε ≥ 0
dist< otherwise
)
∨
(
||rc| − ‖po − pc‖| >
{
V
(
ε+ vr+arεb
)
if vr + arε ≥ 0
−V vrar otherwise
) (71)
dyn1 ≡ see Model 2 (72)
Model 8 Passive safety despite location uncertainty, extends Model 2
dwpslu ≡ (locate; ctrl; dyn)∗ (see Model 2 for details) (73)
locate ≡ pˆr := (∗, ∗); ?‖pˆr − pr‖ ≤ ∆p (74)
safe ≡ ‖pˆr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b
+ V
vr
b
+∆p +
(
A
b
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + ε(vr + V )
)
(75)
7.3.2 Actuator Perturbation
Model 9 introduces actuator perturbation between control and dynamics, cf. (76). Actuator perturbation
affects the acceleration by a damping factor δa, known to be at most a maximum damping ∆a, i. e., δa ∈
[∆a, 1], cf. (77). Note, that this damping factor can change arbitrarily often, but is assumed to be constant
during the continuous evolution that takes a maximum of ε time units. The perturbation may cause the robot
to have full acceleration (δa = 1) but fully reduced braking (δa = ∆a). For instance, the robot accelerates
on perfect terrain, but is unlucky enough to be on slippery terrain again when it brakes. The robot considers
this worst-case scenario during control in its safety constraint (78).
Theorem 8 (Passive safety despite actuator perturbation). If φps ∧ ∆a > 0 holds initially, then the model
dwpsap (Model 9) guarantees passive safety, as expressed by the provable dL formula
φps ∧∆a > 0→ [dwpsap]ψps .
We proved Theorem 8 in KeYmaera, so that the robot guarantees passive safety if it accounts for the
actuator perturbation as stated in the safety constraint (78).
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Model 9 Passive safety despite actuator perturbation, extends Model 2
dwpsap ≡ (ctrl; act; dyn)∗ (see Model 2 for details) (76)
act ≡ δa := ∗; ?(0 < ∆a ≤ δa ≤ 1); a˜r := δaar; (77)
safe ≡ ‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b∆a
+ V
vr
b∆a
+
(
A
b∆a
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + ε(vr + V )
)
(78)
dyn of Model 2 with ar replaced by a˜r
7.3.3 Velocity Uncertainty
Model 10 Passive safety despite velocity uncertainty, extends Model 2
dwpsvu ≡ (ctrl; dyn)∗ (see Model 2 for details) (79)
ctrlr ≡ vˆ := ∗; ?(vˆ ≥ 0 ∧ vr −∆v ≤ vˆ ≤ vr +∆v); (80)
(ar :=−b)
∪ (?vr = 0; ar := 0; ωr := 0) (81)
∪ (ar := ∗; ?− b ≤ ar ≤ A; ωr := ∗; ?−Ω ≤ ωr ≤ Ω; (82)
pc := (∗, ∗); dr := (∗, ∗); po := (∗, ∗); ?curve ∧ safe)
safe ≡ ‖pr − po‖∞ > (vˆ +∆v)
2
2b
+ V
vˆ +∆v
b
+
(
A
b
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + ε(vˆ +∆v + V )
)
(83)
Model 10 introduces velocity uncertainty. To account for the uncertainty, the robot reads off a (possibly
inexact) measurement vˆ of its velocity vr at the beginning of its control phase (80). It knows that the
measured velocity vˆ deviates by at most a measurement error ∆v from the actual velocity vr. Also, the
robot knows that its velocity is non-negative. Thus, we can assume that vˆ is always equal to or greater than
zero by a corresponding transformation of the measurements. In order to stay safe, the controller has to
make sure that the robot stays safe even if its true velocity is maximally larger than the measurement, i. e.
vr = vˆ + ∆v. The idea is now that the controller makes all control choices with respect to the maximal
velocity vˆ +∆v instead of the actual velocity vr. The continuous evolution, in contrast, still uses the actual
vr, of course, because the robot’s physics will not be confused by a sensor measurement error. Now, since
we used the maximal possible velocity when considering the safety of new curves in the controller we can
prove that the robot will still be safe. A problem when using vˆ instead of vr occurs in the second branch
(80) of ctrlr: Because of the velocity uncertainty we no longer know if vr is zero (i. e. the robot is stopped),
which is necessary for changing the direction of the robot. However, one can argue that even with velocity
uncertainty the robot should still know when it came to a stop. Thus, we leave the branch unchanged and
still use the test ?vr = 0 inside it.
Theorem 9 (Passive safety despite velocity uncertainty). If started in a state where φps holds, then the model
dwpsvu (Model 10) guarantees passive safety, as expressed by the provable dL formula φps ∧ ∆v ≥ 0 →
[dwpsvu]ψps.
We proved Theorem 9 in KeYmaera.
30
S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Obstacle Avoidance and Navigation of Ground Robots
7.4 Non-Synchronized Control of Obstacle and Robot
In the models so far, the controllers of the robot and the obstacle were executed synchronously, i. e., the robot
and the obstacle made their control decisions at the same time. While the obstacle could always choose its
previous control choices again if it does not want to act, the previous models only allowed the obstacle to
decide when the robot made a control decision, too.14 This does not reflect reality perfectly, since we want
liberal obstacle models without assumptions about when an obstacle makes a control decision. We want to
make sure that the robot remains safe regardless of how often and at which times the obstacles change their
speed and orientation.
Model 11 Non-Synchronized Control of Obstacle and Robot
dwpsns ≡ (ctrlr; t := 0; (ctrlo; dyn)∗)∗ see Model 2 (84)
Therefore, in Model 11 we now model the control of the obstacle in an inner loop around the continuous
evolution dyn in (84) so that the obstacle control can interrupt continuous evolution at any time to make
a decision, and then continue dynamics immediately without giving the robot’s controller a chance to run.
This means that the obstacle can make as many control decisions as it wants during the continuous evolution.
The controller of the robot is still guaranteed to be invoked after at most time ε has passed, as modeled with
the evolution domain constraint t ≤ ε.
Theorem 10 (Passive safety for non-synchronized controllers). If started under initial conditions φps, the
model dwpsns (Model 11) guarantees passive safety, as expressed by the provable dL formula φps → [dwpsns]ψps.
We proved Theorem 10 with KeYmaera. The proof uses φps as an invariant for the outer loop, whereas
the invariant for the inner loop additionally preserves the differential invariants used for handling the dy-
namics dyn.
7.5 Arbitrarily Many Obstacles
The models so far are phrased in terms of a single but nondeterministic obstacle model, which is character-
ized by a maximum velocity V that an obstacle can have. This is safe, since all obstacles are considered by
the nondeterministic obstacle choices. In the presence of different obstacles with different properties this
can, however, lead to an inefficient controller, because we have to consider the same maximum velocity V
for all obstacles, even if they differ significantly (e. g. stationary obstacles with maximal velocity V = 0
and pedestrians or even other cars with larger velocity bounds).
Modeling To make the controller more efficient, we will go from hybrid programs to quantified hybrid
programs for distributed hybrid systems [28], i.e., systems that combine distributed systems aspects (lots of
obstacles) with hybrid systems aspects (discrete control decisions and continuous motion). We introduce a
sort O representing obstacles so that arbitrarily many obstacles can be represented in the model simultane-
ously. Each object of the sort O has the following properties: a maximum velocity, a position and an actual
velocity. To model these properties, we introduce the non-rigid functions po : O → R2, vo : O → R2, and
V : O → R such that po(i) describes the current position of obstacle i and vo(i) the current velocity of
14Note that dL follows the common assumption that discrete actions do not take time; time only passes in ODEs. So all discrete
actions happen at the same real point in time, even though they are ordered sequentially.
31
S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Obstacle Avoidance and Navigation of Ground Robots
obstacle i as well as V (i) the maximal velocity of a specific obstacle instance i. Note that po(i) and vo(i)
are vectors in two-dimensional space.
This new modeling paradigm also allows for another improvement in the model: So far, the closest
obstacle was chosen by picking a position in ctrlr nondeterministically. Such a nondeterministic choice
includes the closest one. A real controller, however, needs to compute which obstacle is actually the closest
one (or consider them all one at a time). Instead of choosing the closest obstacle nondeterministically in the
model, using QdL we can consider all obstacles by quantifying over all instances of the sort O.
In the obstacle controller ctrlo (86) we use a loop to allow multiple obstacles to make a control deci-
sion. Each run of that loop selects an obstacle instance i arbitrarily and updates its velocity vector (but
no longer its position, since obstacles are now tracked individually). The loop can be repeated arbitrarily
often. Thus, some arbitrary finite number of obstacles can make control choices in (86). In the continuous
evolution, instead, we have to quantify over all obstacles in order to express that all obstacles change their
state according to the differential equations simultaneously, see (89).
Model 12 Explicit representation of countably many obstacles, extends Model 2
dwnobs ≡ (ctrlo; ctrlr; dyn)∗ (85)
ctrlo ≡
(
i := ∗; vo(i) := (∗, ∗); ?‖vo(i)‖ ≤ V (i)
)∗ (86)
ctrlr ≡ see Model 2 on page 17 for details (87)
safe ≡ ∀i ∈ O. ‖pr − po(i)‖∞ >
{
− v2rar − V (i) vrar if vr + arε < 0
v2r
2b + V (i)
vr
b +
(
ar
b + 1
) (
ar
2 ε
2 + ε(vr + V (i))
)
otherwise
(88)
dyn ≡ ∀i ∈ O. (t′ = 1, p′r = vrdr, d′r = −ωrd⊥r , v′r = ar, ω′r =
ar
r
, p′o(i) = vo(i) & vr ≥ 0 ∧ t ≤ ε)
(89)
We phrase the loop invariant ϕnobs, the initial condition φnobs, and the safety condition ψnobs as before
except that they are now phrased for all obstacles i ∈ O, see (90)–(92). These generalize the single-obstacle
conditions (30)–(32) on page 18.
ϕnobs ≡ vr 6= 0→ ∀i ∈ O.‖pr − po(i)‖∞ > v
2
r
2b
+ V (i)
vr
b
(90)
φnobs ≡ vr = 0 ∧ rc 6= 0 ∧ ‖dr‖ = 1 (91)
ψnobs ≡ vr 6= 0→ ∀i ∈ O.‖pr − po(i)‖∞ > 0 (92)
Verification These conditions are the basis for defining passive safety in the presence of arbitrary many
obstacles in Theorem 11.
Theorem 11 (Passive safety in presence of arbitrary obstacles). If φnobs holds initially, then the model dwnobs
(Model 12) guarantees passive safety, as expressed by the provable QdL formula φnobs → [dwnobs]ψnobs.
We proved Theorem 11 with KeYmaera.
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8 Liveness Verification of Ground Robot Navigation
Safety properties formalize that some bad behavior (such as collisions) will never happen. Liveness proper-
ties formalize that certain good things (such as reaching a goal) will ultimately happen. It would be easy to
design a trivial controller that is only safe (just never move) or only live (full speed toward the goal ignoring
all obstacles). The trick is to design robot controllers that meet both goals. The safe controllers identified
in the previous sections are guaranteed safe (no collisions) and also allow motion. This combination of
guaranteed safety under all circumstances (by a proof) and validated liveness under usual circumstances
(validated only by some tests) is often sufficient for practical purposes. Yet, without a liveness proof, there
is no guarantee that the robot controller will reach its respective goal except in the circumstances that have
been tested before. In this section, we will, thus, verify liveness properties, since the precision gained by
formalizing the desired liveness properties as well as the circumstances under which they can be guaranteed
is quite insightful.
Formalizing liveness properties is even more difficult and the resulting questions are usually much harder
than safety. Both safety and liveness properties only hold when they are true in the myriad of situations with
different environmental behavior that they conjecture. They are diametrically opposed, because liveness
requires motion but safety considerations may inhibit motion. For the safe robot models that we consider
here, liveness is, thus, quite a challenge, because there are many ways that environmental conditions or
behavior would make the robot stop or turn around for safety reasons, preventing it from achieving its goals.
For example, an unrestricted obstacle could move around to just block the robot’s path and then, as the robot
re-plans to find another trajectory, move over to block the new path instead. To guarantee liveness, one has
to characterize all necessary conditions that allow the robot to reach its goal, which are often prohibitively
many. Full adversarial behavior can be handled but is challenging [32].
For a liveness proof, we deem three conditions important:
Adversarial behavior. Carefully defines acceptable adversarial behavior that the robot can handle. For
example, crossing a robot’s path might be acceptable in the operating conditions, but trapping the
robot in a corner might not.
Conflicting goals. Identifies conflicting goals for different agents. For example, if the goal of one robot is
to indefinitely occupy a certain space and that of another is to reach this very space there is no possible
way for both to satisfy their requirements.
Progress. Characterizes progress formally. For example, in the presence of obstacles a robot sometimes
needs to move away from the goal in order to ultimately get to the goal. But how far is a robot
allowed to deviate on the detour?
Liveness conditions that are true, thus, usually need to define some reasonable restrictions on the be-
havior of adversarial agents in the environment. For example, a movable obstacle may block the robot’s
way for some limited amount of time, but not indefinitely. And when the obstacles moves on it may not
turn around immediately again. Liveness conditions may also define a compromise between reaching the
goal and having at least invested reasonable effort of trying to get to the goal, if unacceptable adversarial
behavior occurred or goals conflicted, or progress is physically impossible.
In this section, we start with a completely stationary environment, so that we first can concentrate on
finding a notion for progress. Next, we let obstacles cross the robot’s path and define what degree of
adversarial behavior is acceptable.
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Model 13 Robot follows a straight line to reach a waypoint
dwwp ≡ (ctrl; dyn)∗ (94)
ctrl ≡ (ar :=−b) (95)
∪ (?vr = 0; ar := 0) (96)
∪ (?pr + v
2
r
2b
+
(
A
b
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + εvr
)
< pg +∆g; ar := ∗; ?− b ≤ ar ≤ A); (97)
∪ (?pr < pg −∆g ∧ vr ≤ Vg; ar := ∗; ?− b ≤ ar ≤ Vg − vr
ε
≤ A) (98)
dyn ≡ t := 0; {p′r = vr, v′r = ar, t′ = 1 & t ≤ ε ∧ vr ≥ 0} (99)
8.1 Reach a Waypoint on a Straight Lane
As a first liveness property, we consider a completely stationary environment without obstacles, which
prevents adversarial behavior as well as conflicting goals, so that we can concentrate on the conditions to
describe how the robot makes progress without the environment interfering actively. We focus on the low-
level motion planning where the robot has to make decisions about acceleration and braking in order to
drive to a waypoint on a straight line. We want our robot to provably reach the waypoint, so that a high-level
planning algorithm knows that the robot can reliably execute its plan by stitching together the complete path
from straight-line segments between waypoints. We consider a simplified version where the robot has to
stop at the waypoint, before it turns to head towards the next. That way, we can split a path into straight-
line segments that make defining progress easier, because they are describable with solvable differential
equations when abstracted into one-dimensional space.
Modeling We say that the robot reached the waypoint when it stops inside a region of size ∆g around the
waypoint. That is: (i) at least one execution enters the goal region, and (ii) all executions stop before exiting
the goal region pg +∆g. The liveness property ψwp (93) characterizes these conditions formally.
ψwp ≡ 〈dwwp〉(pg −∆g < pr) ∧ [dwwp](pr < pg +∆g) (93)
Remark 1. The liveness property ψwp (93) is formulated as a conjunction of two constraints: at least one run
enters the goal region 〈dwwp〉pg −∆g < pr, while none exits the goal region on the other end [dwwp]pr <
pg +∆g. In particular, there is a run that will stop inside the goal region, which, explicitly, corresponds to
extending formula (93) to the following liveness property:
〈dwwp〉(pg −∆g < pr ∧ 0 ≤ vr ≤ Vg ∧ 〈dwwp〉vr = 0)
∧[dwwp](pr < pg +∆g)
(100)
Formula (100) means that there is an execution of model dwwp where the robot enters the goal region
without exceeding the maximum approach velocity Vg, and from where the model has an execution that will
stop the robot 〈dwwp〉vr = 0. The proof for formula (100) uses vr = 0 ∨ (vr > 0 ∧ vr − nεb ≤ 0) to
characterize progress (i. e., braking for duration nε will stop the robot).
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Model 13 describes the behavior of the robot for approaching a goal region. In addition to the three
familiar options from previous models of braking unconditionally (95), staying stopped (96), or accelerating
when safe (97), the model now contains a fourth control option (98) to carefully approach the goal region.
Recall that in a proof, we have to show that the robot will get to the goal under any circumstance except
those explicitly characterized as being assumed not to happen, e. g., unreasonably small goal regions, high
robot velocity, or hardware faults, such as engine or brake failure. Similar to safety proofs, these assumptions
are often linked. For example, a goal region is unreasonably small given a robot’s engine parameters, if the
robot will cross it without possibility to stop by just accelerating once from its initial position. In this case,
both options of the robot will violate our liveness condition: it can either stay stopped and not reach the
goal, or it can start driving and miss the goal.
Therefore, we introduce a maximum velocity Vg that the robot has to obey when it is close to the goal,
similar to trains entering train stations slowly. That velocity must be small enough so that the robot can stop
inside the goal region and is used as follows. While obeying the approach velocity Vg outside the goal region
(98), the robot can choose any acceleration that will not let it exceed the maximum approach velocity. The
dynamics of the robot in this model follows a straight line, assuming it is already oriented directly towards
the goal (99).
Identification of Live Controls Now that we know what the goal of the robot will be, we give the intuition
behind the conditions that make achieving the goal possible at all. The robot is only allowed to adapt its
velocity with other choices than full braking when those choices are not going to overshoot the goal region,
see pg +∆g in (97) and pg −∆g in (98). Condition (98) −b ≤ ar ≤ Vg−vrε ≤ A ensures that the robot will
only pick acceleration values that will not exceed the approach velocity Vg in the next ε time units, i. e., until
it can revise its decision. Once inside the goal region, the only choice remaining is to brake (since allowed
unconditionally), which makes the robot stop close to the waypoint.
The robot is stopped initially (vr = 0) someplace outside the goal region (pr < pg − ∆g), its brakes
b > 0 and engine A > 0 are working,15 and it has some known reaction time ε > 0, cf. (101).
φwp ≡ vr = 0 ∧ pr < pg −∆g ∧ b > 0 ∧A > 0
∧ ε > 0 ∧ 0 < Vg ∧ Vgε+
V 2g
2b
< 2∆g
(101)
Most importantly, the approach velocity Vg and the size of the goal region 2∆g must be adequate. That
way, we know that the robot has a choice to approach the goal with a velocity that fits to the size of the goal
region.
Verification Similar to safety verification, for liveness verification we combine the initial condition φwp
(101), the model dwwp Model 13, and the liveness property ψwp (93) in a provable theorem Theorem 12.
Theorem 12 (Reach waypoint). If the robot starts in a state where φwp (101) holds, then there exists at least
one execution of the control model dwwp such that pg−∆g < pr holds, while for all executions pr < pg+∆g
holds, as expressed by the provable dL formula φwp → ψwp, i. e., with ψwp from (93) expanded:
φwp →
(〈dwwp〉(pg −∆g < pr) ∧ [dwwp](pr < pg +∆g)) .
15For safety A ≥ 0 is sufficient, but in order to reach a goal the robot must be able to accelerate to non-zero velocities.
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We proved Theorem 12 using KeYmaera. In this proof, we need a variant that characterizes what it
means to make progress towards reaching the goal region [23]. This induction principle for liveness is dual
to a loop invariant for proving safety properties about loops by induction. If the progress measure indicates
the goal would be reachable with n iterations of the main loop of Model 13, then we have to show that
by executing the loop once we can get to a state where the progress measure indicates the goal would be
reachable in the remaining n− 1 loop iterations.
Informally, we can reach the goal if the robot currently has a positive velocity 0 < vr and it either enters
the goal region by just driving for time nε with that velocity or it is already at the goal, as summarized by
the loop variant ϕwp (102).
ϕwp ≡ 0 < vr ≤ Vg ∧ pg −∆g <
{
pr + nεvr if pr ≤ pg −∆g
pr otherwise
(102)
Next, we analyze liveness in the presence of other moving agents.
8.2 Cross an Intersection
In this section, we prove liveness for scenarios in which the robot has to pass an intersection, while a moving
obstacle may cross the robot’s path, so that the robot may need to stop for safety reasons to let the obstacle
pass. We want to prove that the robot has a way to successfully pass the intersection. The model captures
the general case of a point-intersection with two entering roads and two exits at the opposing side, so that it
subsumes any scenario where a robot and an obstacle drive straight to cross an intersection, as illustrated in
Fig. 9.
robot pr
po obstacle
px = (p
x
x, p
y
x) intersection
Figure 9: Illustration of the paths of a robot (black solid line) and an obstacle (red dashed line) crossing an
intersection at point px.
Modeling Since there is a moving obstacle present, the robot needs to follow a collision avoidance pro-
tocol (here, for simplicity, we choose passive safety) in order to safely cross the intersection. Collision
avoidance alone, however, will not reliably let the robot make progress. Thus, we will model a robot that
favors making progress towards the other side of the intersection, and only falls back to collision avoidance
when the obstacle is too close to pass safely.
Note, that intersections provide a simple strategy for the obstacle to prevent the robot from ever passing
the intersection: the obstacle just needs to block the entire intersection forever by stopping there (e. g.,
somebody built a wall so that the intersection essentially disappeared). Clearly, no one could demand
the robot passes the intersection in such impossible cases. We want to prove that the robot can pass the
intersection when obstacles behave reasonably. We, therefore, have to include a restriction on how long the
obstacle may reside at the intersection. For the sake of simplicity, we choose to introduce a strictly positive
minimum velocity Vmin to prevent the obstacle from stopping.
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Model 14 Robot has to cross an intersection
dwcx ≡ (ctrlo; ctrlr; dyn)∗ (103)
ctrlo ≡ ao := ∗; ?(−b ≤ ao ≤ A) (104)
ctrlr ≡


ar := ∗; ?− b ≤ ar ≤ A if AfterX
ar := ∗; ?0 ≤ ar ≤ A if PassFaster
ar := 0 if PassConst
(ar :=−b)
∪ (?vr = 0; ar := 0) otherwise (cf. Model 2)
∪ (?safe; . . . )
(105)
dyn ≡ t := 0; {p′r = vr, v′r = ar, (106)
p′o = vo, v
′
o = ao, t
′ = 1 (107)
& t ≤ ε ∧ vr ≥ 0 ∧ vo ≥ Vmin} (108)
Identification of Live Controls For ensuring progress, the model uses three conditions (AfterX, PassFaster,
and PassConst) that tell the robot admissible conditions for choosing its acceleration, depending on its own
position and the obstacle position in relation to the intersection. The robot can choose any acceleration if it
already passed the intersection:
AfterX ≡ pr > pxx .
The robot is allowed to increase its speed if it manages to pass safely in front of the obstacle (even if the
obstacle speeds up during the entire process), or if speeding up would still let the robot pass safely behind
the obstacle (even if the obstacle drives with only minimum speed Vmin):
PassFaster ≡ vr > 0 ∧ (PassFront ∨ PassBehind)
PassFront ≡ po + vo p
x
x − pr
vr
+A
(
pxx − pr
vr
)2
< pyx
PassBehind ≡ pyx < po + Vmin
pxx − pr
vr +Aε
The robot is allowed to just maintain its speed if it either passes safely in front or behind the obstacle with
that speed:
PassConst ≡ vr > 0 ∧ pyx < po + Vmin
pxx − pr
vr
.
In all other cases, the robot has to follow the collision avoidance protocol from Model 2 to choose its
speed, modified accordingly for the one-dimensional variant here.
Verification As a liveness condition, we want to prove that the robot will make it past the intersection
without colliding with the obstacle.
Theorem 13 (Pass Intersection). When starting with initial conditions φcx being satisfied, the robot can
successfully pass the intersection pr > pxx when following dwcx from Model 14:
φcx → 〈dwcx〉pr > pxx .
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Model 15 Robot reaches a waypoint before a deadline expires
dwwpdl ≡ (ctrl; dyn)∗ (110)
ctrl ≡


(ar :=−b) ∪ (?vr = 0; ar := 0) if pg −∆g < pr
ar :=A if pr +
v2r−V
2
g
2b +
(
A
b + 1
) (
A
2 ε
2 + εvr
) ≤ pg −∆g
ar := ∗; ?− b ≤ ar ≤ Vg−vrε ≤ A otherwise
(111)
dyn ≡ t := 0; p′r = vr, v′r = ar, t′ = 1, T ′ = −1 & t ≤ ε ∧ vr ≥ 0 (112)
We proved Theorem 13 in KeYmaera.
8.3 Liveness with Deadlines
So far, the liveness proofs showed that the robot is able to achieve a useful goal if it makes the right choices.
The proofs do neither guarantee that the robot will always make the right decisions, nor do they specify how
long it will take until the goal will be achieved. In this section, we want to ensure that it always achieves its
goals within a reasonable amount of time. In other words: previously we showed that the robot can do the
right thing to ultimately get to the goal, while here we want to ensure that it always makes the right decisions
that will take it to the waypoint or let it cross an intersection within a bounded amount of time. This means,
we need to show not only that there exists an execution such that the robot achieves its goals (ensures model
feasibility), but also that all possible executions do so in the given time (ensures model correctness).
For such proofs, we need to specify a deadline. We are going to illustrate two alternatives for modeling
deadlines: in Section 8.3.1 we will use a countdown T that is initialized to the deadline and expires when
T < 0, whereas in Section 8.3.2 we will use T as a clock that is initialized to a negative starting value
T < 0 and counts up to a deadline D > 0, so that two deadlines (crossing zero and exceeding D) can be
represented with a single clock variable.
8.3.1 Reaching a Waypoint
Let us again start by defining a correctness condition for reaching a waypoint.
ψwpdl ≡ (T ≤ 0→ vr = 0 ∧ pg −∆g < pr) ∧ pr < pg +∆g (109)
Formula (109) expresses that after the deadline (T ≤ 0, i. e. countdown T expired) the robot will be
stopped inside the goal region (vr = 0 ∧ pg − ∆g < pr). And that it will never be past the goal region
(pr < pg +∆g).
Modeling Model 15 is the familiar loop of control followed by dynamics (110). Unlike in previous mod-
els, braking and staying put is no longer allowed unconditionally for the sake of reaching the waypoint
reliably in time (111). The robot accelerates maximally whenever possible without rushing past the way-
point region, cf. (111). In all other cases, the robot chooses acceleration to control towards the approach
velocity Vg (111). The dynamics remain unchanged, except for the additional countdown T ′ = −1 of the
deadline in (112).
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Identification of Live Controls In order to prove this model live, we need to set achievable deadlines,
as formalized in (113). The deadline has to be large enough (a) for the robot to accelerate to velocity Vg,
(b) drive to the waypoint with that velocity, and (c) once it is there, still have sufficient time to stop. It also
needs a slack time ε, so that the robot can react to being given the deadline. Finally, the conditions φwp that
enable the robot to reach a waypoint at all have to hold as well.
φwpdl ≡ T > Vg − vr
A︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+
pg −∆− pr
Vg︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
+
Vg
b︸︷︷︸
(c)
+ε ∧ φwp (113)
Verification A proof of the robot always making the right choices is a combination of a safety and a
liveness proof: we have to prove that all choices of the robot reach the goal before the deadline expires
(safety proof), and that there exists at least one way of the robot reaching the goal before the deadline
expires (liveness proof).
Theorem 14. If the robot starts in a state where φwpdl (113) holds, then control model dwwpdl ensures that
the robot will reach the waypoint before the deadline expires, as expressed by the provable dL formula
φwpdl →
(
[dwwpdl]ψwpdl ∧ 〈dwwpdl〉ψwpdl
)
.
We proved Theorem 14 using KeYmaera.
8.3.2 Crossing an Intersection
Crossing an intersection before a deadline is more complicated than reaching a waypoint, because the robot
may need to wait for the intersection to clear so that it can cross safely.
Modeling Model 16 remains almost identical to Model 14, except for the robot controller, which has an
additional control branch: when the obstacle already passed the intersection, we want the robot to pass as
fast as it can by accelerating fully with maximum acceleration A.
Model 16 Crossing an intersection before a deadline expires
dwcxd ≡ (ctrlo; ctrlr; dyn)∗ (114)
ctrlo ≡ ctrlo of Model 14 (115)
ctrlr ≡
{
ar :=A if po > pyx
ctrlr of Model 14 otherwise
(116)
dyn ≡ dyn of Model 14 (117)
Identification of Live Controls Given the robot behavior of Model 16 above, we need to set a deadline
that the robot can actually achieve, considering when (recall that it should still not collide with the obstacle)
and how much progress the robot can actually make while driving. Hence, the deadline has to account
for both the robot and the obstacle position relative to the intersection, as well as how much the robot can
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accelerate. Let us start with the easiest case for finding a deadline D: when the obstacle already passed
the intersection, the robot simply has to accelerate with maximum acceleration until it itself passes the
intersection. The obstacles are assumed to never turn back, so accelerating fully is also a safe choice. The
robot might be stopped. So, assuming we start a deadline timer T at time 0, the robot will drive a distance
of A2D
2 until the deadline D expires (i. e., until T = D). However, since we use a sampling interval of ε in
the robot controller, the robot may not notice that the obstacle already passed the intersection for up to time
ε, which means it will only accelerate for time D − ε. Formula (118) summarizes this case.
ηDcxd ≡ D ≥ ε ∧ pxx − pxr <
A
2
(D − ε)2 (118)
If unlucky, the robot determines that it cannot pass safely in front of the obstacle and will have to wait
until the obstacle passed the intersection. Hence, in the deadline we have to account for the additional
time that the obstacle may need at most to pass the intersection. We could increase D with the appropriate
additional time and still start the timer at T = 0, if we rephrase the implicit definition of the deadline
pxx − pr < A2 (D − ε)2 in (118) to its explicit form D > . . .. In (119), instead, we start the deadline timer
with a negative time T < 0,16 such that it becomes T = 0 when the obstacle is located at the intersection.
ηTcxd ≡ T = min
(
0,
po − pyx
Vmin
)
(119)
Verification Theorem 15 uses the deadline conditions (118) and (119) in a liveness property for Model 16.
Theorem 15 (Cross intersection before deadline). For appropriate deadline choices, there exists a run of
model dwcxd, such that when the deadline timer is expired (T ≥ D) the robot is past the intersection
(pr > pxx).
φcxd ∧ ηDcxd ∧ ηTcxd → [dwcxd](T ≥ D → pr > pxx) (120)
9 Interpretation of Verification Results
16Recall, that po < pyx holds when the obstacle did not yet pass the intersection.
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Table 5: Invariant and safety constraint summary
Safety Invariant +Safe Control
Static (Model 1, Theorem 1) ‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b +
(
A
b + 1
) (
A
2 ε
2 + εvr
)
Passive (Model 2, Theorem 2) vr 6= 0→ ‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b + V
vr
b +
(
A
b + 1
) (
A
2 ε
2 + ε(vr + V )
)
Passive friendly (Model 3, Theorem 3) ‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b + V
(
vr
b + τ
)
+ V
2
2bo
+
(
A
b + 1
) (
A
2 ε
2 + ε(vr + V )
)
Passive orientation isVisible > 0→ ‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b + V
vr
b +
(
A
b + 1
) (
A
2 ε
2 + ε(vr + V )
)
(Model 5, Theorem 4) and γ|r| > v2r2b +
(
A
b + 1
) (
A
2 ε
2 + εvr
)
Extensions (passive safety examples)
+ location uncertainty (Model 8) vr 6= 0→ ‖pˆr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b + V
vr
b +
(
A
b + 1
) (
A
2 ε
2 + ε(vr + V )
)
+∆p
+ actuator perturbation (Model 9) vr 6= 0→ ‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b∆a
+ V vrb∆a +
(
A
b∆a
+ 1
) (
A
2 ε
2 + ε(vr + V )
)
+ velocity uncertainty (Model 10) vr 6= 0→ ‖pr − po‖∞ > (vˆ+∆v)
2
2b + V
vˆ+∆v
b +
(
A
b + 1
) (
A
2 ε
2 + ε(vˆ +∆v + V )
)
+ intermittent sensor failure vr 6= 0→ ‖pˆr − po‖ > v
2
r
2b + V
vr
b +
(
A
b + 1
) (
A
2 ε
2 + ε(vr + V )
)
+ g∆d
with actual acceleration (Model 6) vr 6= 0→ ‖pr − po‖∞ >
{
− v2r2ar − V vrar
v2r
2b + V
vr
b
if vr + arε < 0
+
(ar
b
+ 1
)(ar
2
ε2 + ε(vr + V )
)
otherwise
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As part of the verification activity, we identified crucial safety constraints that have to be satisfied in
order to choose a new curve or accelerate safely. These constraints are entirely symbolic and summarized in
Table 5. When instantiated with concrete numerical values of a robot design, these safety constraints can be
used to facilitate design decisions and get an intuition about how conservative or aggressive our robot can
drive, such as
• how fast can the robot pass through a door?
• how fast can the robot drive on a corridor?
Below, we analyze the constraints for several values of acceleration force, braking force, control cycle
time, and obstacle distance (i. e., door width, corridor width).
9.1 Safe Distances and Velocities
Static safety Let us recall the safe control constraint (13) from Model 1, which is justified by the proof of
Theorem 1 to correctly capture when it is safe to accelerate in the presence of stationary obstacles po.
‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b
+
(
A
b
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + εvr
)
The constraint links the current velocity vr and the distance to the nearest obstacle through the design
parameters A (maximum acceleration), b (maximum braking force), and ε (maximal controller cycle time).
Table 6 lists concrete choices for these parameters and the minimum safety distance identified by (13) in
Model 1. All except the third robot configuration (whose movement and acceleration capabilities outper-
form its reaction time) would lead to a reasonable performance in in-door navigation environments. Fig. 10
plots the minimum safety distance that a specific robot configuration requires in order to avoid stationary
obstacles, obtained from (13) by instantiating the parameters A, b, ε and the current velocity vr.
Table 6b turns the question around and lists concrete choices for these parameters and the resulting
maximum safe velocity of the robot that (13) identifies. Fig. 11 plots the maximum velocity that the robot can
travel in order to avoid stationary obstacles. The maximum velocity is obtained from (13) by instantiating
Table 6: Static safety: minimum safe distance and maximum velocity for select configurations
(a) Minimum safe distance
vr
[
m
s
]
A
[
m
s2
]
b
[
m
s2
]
ε [s] ‖pr − po‖ [m]
1 1 1 0.05 0.61
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.025 0.28
2 2 2 0.1 1.42
1 1 2 0.05 0.33
1 2 1 0.05 0.66
(b) Maximum velocity through corridors and doors
A
[
m
s2
]
b
[
m
s2
]
ε [s] vr
[
m
s
]
Co
rr
id
o
r
‖p
r
−
p
o
‖
=
1.
25
m
1 1 0.05 1.48
0.5 0.5 0.025 1.09
2 2 0.1 1.85
1 2 0.05 2.08
2 1 0.05 1.43
D
o
o
r
‖p
r
−
p
o
‖
=
0.
25
m
1 1 0.05 0.61
0.5 0.5 0.025 0.47
2 2 0.1 0.63
1 2 0.05 0.85
2 1 0.05 0.56
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Figure 10: Safety distance for static safety
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Figure 11: Comparison of safe velocities for static safety and passive safety with acceleration A = 1 and
braking b = 1
the parameters A, b, ε and the distance to the nearest obstacle ‖pr − po‖. This way of reading the safety
constraint (13) makes it possible to adapt the maximal desired velocity of the robot safely based on the
current spatial relationships.
Moving obstacles Below, we repeat the safety constraint for accelerating or choosing a new curve in the
presence of movable obstacles. The constraint introduces a new parameter V for the maximum velocity of
obstacles.
‖pr − po‖∞ > v
2
r
2b
+ V
vr
b
+
(
A
b
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + ε(vr + V )
)
Fig. 12 plots the minimum safety distance that the robot needs in order to maintain passive safety in the
presence of moving obstacles. Note, that the maximum velocity in presence of movable obstacles can drop
to zero when the obstacles can move too fast, the controller cycle time or the maximum acceleration force
are too large, or when the maximum available braking force is too low.
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Table 7: Passive safety: minimum safe distance and maximum velocity for select configurations
(a) Minimum safe distance
vr
[
m
s
]
A
[
m
s2
]
b
[
m
s2
]
V
[
m
s
]
ε [s] ‖pr − po‖ [m]
1 1 1 1 0.05 0.61
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.025 0.28
2 2 2 2 0.1 1.42
1 1 2 1 0.05 0.33
1 2 1 2 0.05 0.66
(b) Maximum velocity through corridors and doors
A
[
m
s2
]
b
[
m
s2
]
V
[
m
s
]
ε [s] vr
[
m
s
]
Co
rr
id
o
r
‖p
r
−
p
o
‖
=
1.
25
m
1 1 1 0.05 0.77
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.025 0.69
2 2 2 0.1 0.61
1 2 1 0.05 0.4
2 1 2 0.05 1.3
D
o
o
r
‖p
r
−
p
o
‖
=
0.
25
m
1 1 1 0.05 0.12
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.025 0.18
2 2 2 0.1 0
1 2 1 0.05 0.26
2 1 2 0.05 1
9.2 Robot and Obstacle Shape
The safety analyses in Section 6 model the robots and the obstacles as points. This abstraction makes safety
verification easier by reducing the number of variables. Safety results for different shapes of robots and
obstacles can be obtained by the usual transformations [18] that account for the robot’s shape as part of the
obstacle (i. e., the robot’s shape blows up every point of an obstacle). That way, distance measurements
carried out by the robot at runtime are translated such that the measurements represent worst-case points.
This method [18] transforms every obstacle point into a region that depends on the robot’s shape; this is
especially useful for distance measurements that provide point clouds as environment measurements, such
as laser range finders. A trajectory of the robot is safe if it does not intersect any of the transformed regions.
10 Monitoring for Compliance At Runtime
Section 6–Section 8 discussed models of obstacle avoidance control and of the physical behavior of ground
robots in their environment, and we proved that these models are guaranteed to possess safety and liveness
properties. The proofs in Section 6–8 present strong evidence of the correctness of the models. If the
models used for verification are an adequate representation of the real robot and its environment, these
proofs transfer to the real system. But any model we can possibly build necessarily deviates from the real
system at least to some extent.
In this section, we discuss how to use ModelPlex [20] to detect and safely respond to deviations between
the model and the real robot in its environment at runtime. ModelPlex complements offline proofs with
runtime monitoring: it periodically executes a monitor, which is systematically synthesized from the verified
models by an automatic proof, and checks input from sensors and output to actuators for compliance with
the model. If a deviation is detected, ModelPlex initiates a fail-safe action, such as stopping the robot to
avoid actively running into obstacles, and, by that, ensure that safety proofs from the model carry over to the
real robot.
A monitor checks actual evolution to discover failures and mismatches with the model. The acceleration
chosen by the robot must fit to the current situation (for example, accelerate only when safe), the chosen
curve must fit to the current orientation, and no unintended change to the robot’s speed, position, orientation,
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Figure 12: Safety distance for passive safety
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Figure 13: Each obstacle point becomes enlarged by the robot shape, transformed by a rotation and transla-
tion back to the robot shape [18]
or assumptions about the obstacles occurred. This means, any variable that is allowed to change in the model
must be monitored. In the examples here, these variables include the robot’s position pr, longitudinal speed
vr, rotational speed ωr, acceleration ar, orientation dr , curve rc, and obstacle position po.
A ModelPlex monitor is designed for periodic sampling: for each variable there will be two observed
values, one from the previous sample time (for example, robot position pr) and one from the current sample
time (for example, robot position p+r ). It is not important for ModelPlex that the values are apart by exactly
the sampling period, but merely that there is an upper bound (ε). A ModelPlex monitor checks in a provably
correct way whether the evolution observed in the difference of the sampled values can be explained by the
model. Fig. 14 illustrates the principle behind a ModelPlex monitor: the values from the previous sample
time serve as starting state for executing the model. The values produced by executing the model are then
compared to the values observed in the current sample time.
The verified models themselves, however, are not helpful as fast executable models, because they involve
nondeterminism and differential equations. Hence, provably correct monitor expressions in real arithmetic
are synthesized from a model using an offline proof in KeYmaera X. These expressions exhaustively capture
the behavior of the models, projected onto the pairwise comparisons of sampled values that are needed at
runtime. The full process is described in detail in [20].
Here, let us focus on a controller monitor expression synthesized from Model 2 above, which captures
all possible decisions of the robot that are considered safe. A controller monitor [20] checks the decisions
of an (unverified) controller implementation for being consistent with the discrete model ctrl. ModelPlex
automatically obtains the discrete model from Model 2 with the ordinary differential equation (ODE) being
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Figure 14: The principle behind a ModelPlex monitor: can the model reproduce or explain the observed
real-world behavior?
safely over-approximated by its evolution domain. The resulting condition monitor in Fig. 15 (121), which is
synthesized by a proof, follows the structure of the model: it captures the assumptions on the obstacle mono,
the evolution domain from dynamics mondyn, as well as the specification for each of the three controller
branches (braking monb, staying stopped mons, or accelerating mona).
The obstacle monitor part mono, see (122), says that the measured obstacle velocity d+r must not exceed
the assumptions made in the model about the maximum velocity of obstacles. The dynamics monitor part
mondyn, see (123), checks the evolution domain of the ODE and that the controller did reset its clock (t+ =
0). The braking monitor monb, see (124) defines that in emergency braking the controller must only hit the
brakes and not change anything else (acceleration a+r = −b, while everything else is of the form x+ = x
meaning that no change is expected).17 When staying stopped mons, see (125), the current robot speed must
be zero (vr = 0), and the controller must choose no acceleration and no rotation (ar = 0 and ωr = 0), while
everything else is unchanged. Finally, the acceleration monitor mona, see (126)–(127), when the distance is
safe the robot can choose any acceleration in the physical limits −b ≤ a+r ≤ A, a new non-spinning steering
c+r 6= 0 that fits to the current speed ω+r c+r = vr; position, orientation, and speed must not be set by the
controller (those follow from the acceleration and steering choice).
11 Conclusion and Future Work
Robots are modeled by hybrid systems, because they share continuous physical motion with advanced com-
puter algorithms controlling their behavior. We demonstrate that this understanding also helps proving
robots safe. We develop hybrid system models of the dynamic window algorithm for autonomous ground
vehicles and prove that the algorithm guarantees both passive safety and passive friendly safety in the pres-
ence of moving obstacles. All the proofs were achieved automatically with some manual guidance using
the theorem prover KeYmaera. We interactively provided inductive and differential invariants (crucial) in
KeYmaera, as well as reduced the number of terms and variables with simple interactions to reduce arith-
metic complexity. 85% of the proof steps were automatic. Most interactive steps were simple arithmetic
simplifications that KeYmaera’s current proof strategies do not yet automate. We augment these models
17Note that unchanged obstacle position p+r = pr means that the robot should not waste time measuring the obstacle’s position,
since braking is safe in any case.
46
S. Mitsch et al. Formal Verification of Obstacle Avoidance and Navigation of Ground Robots
monitor ≡ mono ∧ mondyn ∧ (monb ∨ mons ∨ mona) (121)
mono ≡ ‖d+r ‖ ≤ V (122)
mondyn ≡ 0 ≤ ε ∧ vr ≥ 0 ∧ t+ = 0 (123)
monb ≡ p+o = po ∧ p+r = pr ∧ d+r = dr ∧ v+r = vr ∧ ω+r = ωr ∧ a+r = −b ∧ c+r = cr (124)
mons ≡ vr = 0 ∧ p+o = po ∧ p+r = pr ∧ d+r = dr ∧ v+r = vr ∧ ω+r = 0 ∧ a+r = 0 ∧ c+r = cr (125)
mona ≡ −b ≤ a+r ≤ A ∧ c+r 6= 0 ∧ ω+r c+r = vr ∧ p+r = pr ∧ d+r = dr ∧ v+r = vr (126)
∧ ‖pr − p+o ‖∞ >
v2r
2b
+ V
vr
b
+
(
A
b
+ 1
)(
A
2
ε2 + ε(vr + V )
)
(127)
Figure 15: Synthesized safety conditions. The generated monitor captures conditions on obstacles mono,
on dynamics mondyn, and on the robot’s decisions on braking monb, staying stopped mons, and accelerating
mona. The monitor distinguishes two observed values per variable, separated by a controller run (for exam-
ple, pr denotes the position before running the controller, whereas p+r denotes the position after running the
controller).
and safety proofs with robustness for localization uncertainty and imperfect actuation. We observe that
incremental revision of models and proofs helps reducing the verification complexity and understanding
the impact of uncertainty on the behavior of the robot. All parameters in our models—such as those for
maximum obstacle velocity and sensor/actuator uncertainty—are fully symbolic and can be instantiated
arbitrarily, including bounds from probabilistic models (e. g., assume the 2σ confidence interval of the dis-
tribution of obstacle velocities as maximum obstacle velocity). In this case, our verified safety guarantees
translate into a safety probability.
Future work includes exploiting more kinematic capabilities (e. g., going sideways with omni-drive) and
explicit accounts for distance measurement uncertainty, which is, however, easier than location uncertainty.
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